Policy Towards Iraq
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Policy Options
What is needed is a serious policy review, one that evaluates containment squarely
against other options that could guide America’s long term Iraq policy. Such a
policy should match available military capabilities to a recognizable and definable
political end-state. For a strategy to be successful, military actions must, in a sense,
deliver the political goal (or at least posture the U.S. for success). Three times last
year, the U.S. prepared a bombing campaign that was a good military plan, but not
a strategy. As one commentator noted, even Desert Fox was "a target list in search
of a strategy." One of the reasons the current policy is so inconclusive is that there
is little confidence that U.S. military action, while competently undertaken and
making Americans feel satisfied, will actually produce the goods. In this case,
making Saddam behave as he never has in his almost forty-year reign.
A top to bottom policy review would examine options such as containment, but in
different form. A broader form of containment might include a more robust
inspections plan, tighter restrictions on Iraqi economic sanctions (i.e. closing the
large current loopholes), an extension of the ‘no-fly zone’ to a ‘no-drive’ zone, and
a clearly articulated policy on when and how military force would be used in
response to Iraqi transgressions. A more narrow form of containment might
abandon the UN sanctions and focus strictly on key Iraqi military capabilities that
the U.S. can monitor through its intelligence networks. The veneer of a UN effort
could be dropped in this case, allowing a smaller coalition of the U.S., Britain,
Kuwait, and key gulf states to enforce the policy. This would allow for
considerably greater flexibility in reacting to Saddam’s moves.
A bolder departure from current policy might be a deterrence strategy. In this plan,
the U.S. would keep a small force in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, but would basically
deter major Iraqi aggression from ‘over the horizon.’ This plan explicitly accepts
the fact that Saddam will remain in power, but de-emphasizes his conflict with the
United States while clearly delineating the conditions under which U.S. power
might return in order to strike Iraq. For this policy to be a success, it would have to
combine a more laissez-faire approach with an iron resoluteness to use massive
force when Iraq has truly stepped over the line, as it did in 1990 when it invaded
Kuwait.
As I noted, in November President Clinton tacitly endorsed an even different
approach - a policy to undermine the Hussein regime, thus helping those elements
in Iraq that might overthrow Saddam. This too is a departure from containment.
Congress has allocated $97 million to support the efforts of Iraqi opposition
groups, although how useful that money might be is a matter of considerable
debate. Having observed the Shiite rebels in action against Saddam in April of
1991, I am not optimistic that any Iraqi opposition group could mount an effective
campaign against Saddam without considerable U.S. military help. As the botched
Kurdish rebellion of 1996 showed, many dissident groups are more interested in
fighting each other than fighting Saddam.
Without significant U.S. help on the ground, I believe that Iraqi opposition groups
are just good enough to get themselves into trouble. The U.S., having encouraged
them to rebel, should be willing to rescue them in the event of setbacks. Should the
U.S. chose to pursue this policy, as President Clinton hinted he might, all involved
must understand that it is not a free lunch. Although, like most of you here, I wish
the Iraqi opposition success and support U.S. aid to these groups, I am skeptical
that Saddam can be deposed without a major U.S. political, financial, and military
commitment that could involve American ground as well as air support in fighting
Saddam.
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