The Iraqi Threat
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7-The inspection regime in Iraq had a mixed history. The International Atomic energy
Agency (IAEA), the UN body charged with ensuring that nuclear facilities are not used
for nuclear weapons production failed completely in its task with regards to Iraq before
the Gulf war. The IAEA remains basically a weak organization beset by its international
composition and the multiple loyalties of its workers. Within its sphere it is quite
successful in accounting for and keeping tab on the essential components of the nuclear
fuel cycle and its utilization over the globe. But it has limited latitude with the states and
works best in a cooperative and amiable environment. Against determined states such as
Iraq it is at a great disadvantage. Thus it failed again after the Gulf war when it declared
early that it took care of basically all of Iraq’s nuclear program. It took the defection of
Kamel, Saddam’s son in law to force the Iraqi government to declare the actual scope of
its nuclear weapons program and forced the inspectors to start all over again in
unraveling what has not been declared before. Thus while it managed to dismantle a large
part of the Iraqi nuclear program it was at a loss by the time the inspectors left in 1998 as
to the whereabouts of many of the important figures in the program. The new Iraqi policy
of giving up some of the equipment but keeping the working teams intact was beyond the
inspectors mandate. There was nothing they could do to prevent the Iraqi teams from
rebuilding what was destroyed.
Iraq is actually quite open about its intents and goals. It refused to promulgate laws that
make it illegal for its citizens to work in the area of WMD as was required by UN
resolutions. It also refuses to accept the limitations imposed by sanctions declaring them
to be illegal. Thus as stated by the former Iraqi ambassador to the UN, Nizar Hamdoun,
Iraq is not going to impose sanctions on itself. This is forced on Iraq and as such the Iraqi
government is not bound by its terms. Policing what Iraq imports is a problem for the UN
and not the Iraqi government.
8- If the inspectors go back now there is very little human intelligence that will help them
locate the new weapons sites. Spread widely among the government infrastructure in
smaller hard to detect units, the inspectors will have a hard time locating all the programs
components. A recent defector with credible information asserted that all units are built
with a backup. If one is detected or is in danger of discovery all activity is immediately
transferred to the back-up facility.
9- The new UNMOVIC inspection body do not have the support and free hand
UNSCOM enjoyed. With Russia and other states that favor removing sanctions keeping
the pressure, the onus is now on the inspectors to prove that Iraq is in violation. Not
finding a smoking gun after a series of inspections is all that the Russians and the French
need to declare that the US has no case and sanctions must be lifted. The US case will be
considerably weakened and more voices will rise against the US Iraqi policy as baseless.
This is a danger that must be carefully examined before inspection terms are allowed
back in possibly to divert an invasion.
10-The claim that the US needs a smoking gun to prove that Iraq is in violation of its
commitments regarding WMD discounts all the past experience in dealing with Iraq.
Many voices declared that Iraq was not pursuing nuclear weapons before the Gulf war.
This included the IAEA that declared Iraq clean in many statements. This happened even
after the German publication Der Spiegel reported Iraq’s successful attempts to acquire
classified uranium centrifuge enrichment technology from Germany. However the US
knew better and used the Gulf war setting as a way to dismantle Iraq’s nuclear weapons
program. But the dismantling process ignored the knowledge base acquired over the
years that can be used easily to rebuild what was destroyed. A similar insistence on proof
before taking serious action will be allowing Saddam to achieve his goals unchallenged.
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