Iraq: Compliance, Sanctions, and U.S. Policy
acting under Iraq’s commitments under the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
However, in May 2000, the IAEA destroyed an Iraqi nuclear centrifuge that Iraq had stored
in Jordan in 1991. The IAEA says that the absence of an inspections program creates
uncertainty about Iraqi nuclear activities. The United States believes that Iraq retains the
expertise (about 7,000 scientists and engineers) and intention to rebuild its nuclear program.
Chemical Weapons
UNSCOM destroyed all chemical weapons materiel uncovered — 38,500 munitions, 690
tons of agents, 3,000 tons of precursor chemicals, and 426 pieces of production equipment
items — and the destruction operation formally ended on June 14, 1994. However, the fate
of about 31,600 chemical munitions, 550 mustard gas bombs, and 4,000 tons of chemical
precursors, remains unknown. Iraq refused to yield an Air Force document, found in July
1998 by UNSCOM, that could explain their fate, although Iraq allowed UNSCOM to take
notes from it. In February 1998 UNSCOM discovered that shells taken from Iraq in 1996
contained 97% pure mustard gas, indicating it was freshly produced.
The primary remaining chemical weapons questions center on VX nerve agent, which
Iraq did not include in its initial postwar declarations and of which no stockpile was ever
located. By 1995 UNSCOM had uncovered enough circumstantial evidence to force Iraq to
admit to producing about 4 tons of VX, but UNSCOM believed that Iraq had imported
enough precursor — about 600 tons — to produce 200 tons of the agent. In late June 1998,
UNSCOM revealed that some unearthed missile warheads, tested in a U.S. Army lab,
contained traces of VX, contradicting Iraq’s assertions that it had not succeeded in stabilizing
the agent. Separate French and Swiss tests did not find conclusive evidence of VX. About
170 chemical sites were under long-term monitoring. Iraq has not signed the Chemical
Weapons Convention that took effect April 29, 1997. Recent U.S. government reports to
Congress, including the CIA report to Congress on January 30, 2002, have said Iraq has
rebuilt some facilities that could be easily converted to chemical weapons production.
Biological Weapons
Iraq did not declare any biological materials, weapons, research, or facilities in its initial
declaration to UNSCOM in April 1991, and no biological stockpile was ever uncovered.
UNSCOM focused initially on the major research and development site at Salman Pak (gutted
and partially buried by Iraq shortly before the first inspection began) and later on the Al
Hakam facility south of Baghdad (dismantled by UNSCOM June 20, 1996). In August 1991,
Iraq admitted that it had a biological weapons research program. In July 1995, Iraq modified
its admission by acknowledging it had an offensive biological weapons program and that it
had produced 19,000 liters of botulinum, 8,400 liters of anthrax, and 2,000 liters of aflatoxin
and clostridium. In August 1995, Iraq confessed to having produced 191 biological bombs,
of which 25 were missile warheads, loaded with anthrax, botulinum, and aflatoxin for use in
the Gulf war, but Iraq claims to have destroyed the bombs after the Gulf conflict. UNSCOM
monitored 86 biological sites during 1994 -1998.
UNSCOM’s position was that Iraq’s biological declarations were not credible or
verifiable. According to UNSCOM, Iraq imported a total of 34 tons of growth media for
producing biological agents during the 1980s, of which 4 tons remain unaccounted for.
UNSCOM still lacked information on Iraq’s development of drop tanks and aerosol
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