Iraq: Compliance, Sanctions, and U.S. Policy
U.S. military action as a last resort. The Senate did not act on a similar resolution,
S.Con.Res. 71, because some Senators wanted it to call for the United States to overthrow
Saddam Husayn.) In November 1997 and February 1998, Russia and U.N. Secretary
General Kofi Annan, respectively, brokered temporary compromises that enabled UNSCOM
to resume inspections. The February 23, 1998 U.N.-Iraq agreement provided for access to
eight “presidential sites” by UNSCOM inspectors and diplomatic observers. Security Council
Resolution 1154 (March 2, 1998) accepted that agreement, threatening “the severest
consequences” if Iraq reneged. Iraq allowed presidential site inspections (1,058 buildings)
during March 26-April 3, 1998, and the United States agreed to lift the travel ban on Iraqi
officials and to resume sanctions reviews.
Iraq subsequently refused to implement an UNSCOM plan for completing its work and,
in August 1998, barred UNSCOM from inspecting new facilities. The Senate and House
passed a resolution, S.J.Res. 54 (P.L. 105-235, signed August 14, 1998), declaring Iraq in
“material breach” of the ceasefire. On September 9, 1998, the Security Council unanimously
adopted Resolution 1194, suspending sanctions reviews. On October 30, 1998, the Security
Council offered an easing of sanctions if Iraq fulfilled WMD and other outstanding
requirements, but Iraq demanded an immediate end to sanctions and it ceased cooperation
with UNSCOM (but not the IAEA). The U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted
Resolution 1205 (November 5, 1998), deeming the Iraqi action a “flagrant violation” of the
February 1998 U.N.-Iraq agreement. On November 14, 1998, with the United States about
to launch airstrikes, Iraq pledged cooperation, narrowly averting U.S. air strikes but
prompting President Clinton to openly declare a U.S. policy of regime change.
Operation Desert Fox and Aftermath. After a month of testing Iraq’s
cooperation, UNSCOM said on December 15, 1998 that Iraq refused to yield known WMDrelated
documents and that it was obstructing inspections; the IAEA did not issue similar
complaints. All inspectors withdrew and a 70-hour U.S. and British bombing campaign
followed (Operation Desert Fox, December 16-19, 1998), directed against Iraqi WMDcapable
facilities and military and security targets. After almost one year of negotiations, the
Security Council adopted Resolution 1284 (December 17, 1999) by a vote of 11- 0 (Russia,
France, China, and Malaysia abstained), providing for the suspension of most sanctions if
Iraq fully cooperates with a new WMD inspection body (UNMOVIC, U.N. Monitoring,
Verification and Inspection Commission). Under 1284, Iraq’s revenues would be subject to
undefined financial controls, exports of dual use items to Iraq would still require U.N.
approval, and arms exports would remain banned.
In January 2000, the Security Council selected as head of UNMOVIC former IAEA
director Hans Blix, who formulated an organizational plan adopted on April 13, 2000. He
reported in August 2000 that UNMOVIC was ready to begin preliminary activities in Iraq.
During February 26-27, 2001, Iraq conducted talks with the U.N. Secretary General about
restarting inspections, but the talks made little progress.
“Axis of Evil” and U.S. Policy. Amid a growing debate over whether to expand
the post-September 11 “war on terrorism” to Iraq and amid fears that Iraq could provide
WMD expertise to terrorist groups, on November 26, 2001, and again in his January 29, 2002
State of the Union message, President Bush appeared to threaten unspecified action if Iraq
did not readmit U.N. weapons inspectors. In the latter speech he described Iraq as part of an
“axis of evil” along with Iran and North Korea. One month prior to the State of the Union
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