Iraq: Compliance, Sanctions, and U.S. Policy
Lebanon, which is under the heavy influence of Syria, restored diplomatic relations with
Iraq October 23, 1998, after a 4-year break. As a sign of warming Iraqi-Egyptian relations,
Iraqi-Egyptian trade under the oil for food program and other trade has now reached $1.7
billion annually. On January 18, 2001, the two countries signed a “free trade agreement,”
although under the condition that it goes into effect when sanctions are lifted. In November
2000, Iraq and Egypt upgraded their interest sections to embassies.
Protecting/Supporting Iraq’s Opposition
The post-September 11 debate on Iraq encompasses the question of whether the United
States will increase support for the Iraqi opposition. For a discussion of the arguments for
and against the regime change policy and the various strategies for accomplishing that
objective, as well as information on U.S. assistance to the Iraqi opposition, see CRS Report
RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime.
As of February 2002, the Iraqi opposition has received $24 million in ESF since 1998,
with $19 million still to be obligated out of $43 million appropriated. The FY2002 foreign
aid bill (H.R. 2506, conference report H.Rept. 107-345) contains a provision authorizing the
expenditure of Economic Support Funds (ESF) in FY2002 to change the Iraqi regime,
although no dollar amount is specified. The conference report also contains language
expressing congressional concern about the results of a State Department audit of the INC’s
use of U.S.-provided funds and suggesting that the U.S. consider funding other opposition
groups in addition to the INC.
Military Action and Long-Term Containment
The current U.S. military posture in the Persian Gulf is focused on containing and
deterring Iraq, and some experts believe that a U.S. decision to overthrow Saddam would
require the use of U.S. forces. Currently, the United States and Britain enforce two “no fly
zones” to provide a measure of protection for Iraq’s Kurdish minority and other objects of
regime repression and to contain Iraq militarily. To enforce the no-fly zones, the two allies
invoke U.N. Resolution 678 (November 29, 1990, authorizing use of force to expel Iraq from
Kuwait), 687 (the main ceasefire resolution), 688 (human rights), and the Safwan Accords
(the March 3, 1991 cease-fire agreements between Iraq and the coalition forces that banned
Iraqi interference with allied air operations). Resolutions 678 and 687 were written under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, dealing with peace and security, and are interpreted as
allowing military action to enforce these resolutions. Resolution 688 (human rights) was not
written under Chapter VII, nor does that or any other resolution establish no fly zones.
To justify Operation Desert Fox, the Administration cited additional justification from
Resolution 1154 (see above), which warned of “the severest consequences” for noncompliance.
Section 1095 of P.L. 102-190, the Defense Authorization Act for FY1992,
signed December 5, 1991, expressed Congress’ support for “all necessary means” to achieve
the goals of U.N. Security Council Resolution 687. (For information on the U.S. military
posture in the Gulf tasked with containing Iraq, see CRS Report RL30728, Persian Gulf:
Issues for U.S. Policy, 2000.) In instances of strikes on Iraq for no fly zone or other
infractions, the Administration also has cited congressional action (primarily P.L. 102-1 of
January 12, 1991, authorizing military action to expel Iraq from Kuwait).
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