The Perfect Soldier: Special Operations, Commandos, and the Future of Us Warfare by James F. Dunnigan
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Situation Desperate, Send More Kurds
by James Dunnigan
July 6, 2015
After 2003 the American strategy in Iraq was simple; hold elections and get the elected government strong enough so that it could take care of itself without American troops. There was one major flaw in this plan, the fact that the majority Shia and Kurds had been excluded from leadership positions in the military, police and government for decades. There were obvious reasons for this (the Sunnis were in charge) but after 2003 loyal (to an elected government) security forces required experienced Shia and Kurdish leaders, who had to be created from scratch. There were some Sunni officers and officials that could be trusted, but most were suspect. That's because of another problem you encounter in much of the Arab world; family, tribe and religious affiliation count for more than national loyalty. This makes sense when you remember that there are no Arab governments that are "just and reliable" in the Western sense. The only institution the individual can depend on for help was the family, tribe or religious organization. Thus you keep hearing about "Arab tribal leaders" getting involved in whatever was happening in Iraq.
Early on American advisors found problems with the new security forces. Since 2006 the quality of the Iraqi security forces, especially the army was tracked by American advisors. Progress was slow and the primary cause of poor performance in Iraqi units was corrupt officers. Too many people in Iraqi society are for sale. This can have deadly results if you are an army officer or police commander. Morale quickly collapses in a unit when the troops realize their boss is only in it for the money. The American advisory teams worked out various drills to try and get rid of corrupt commanders but they often find several higher layers in the chain of command were also corrupt. The senior U.S. commanders ended up having tense meeting with senior government officials, or the prime minister himself, over this. Getting rid of dirty generals was (and still is) difficult if the general is well connected politically. For this reason, experienced Sunni Arab officers were preferred for a while, even if they were hated by the majority Kurds and Shia Arabs. The Sunni Arab guy knew he is on a terrorist hit list for just wearing the uniform, but usually had the idea that if he did well the new government would protect him and his family. These men served as role models and mentors for less experienced Shia officers. While officers are divided by a bloody religious and political history many were united by professional respect, and necessity. But in the end religion and ethnicity proved more important than anything else.
The one bright spot in all this is the Kurds (of Iraq and Syria). Since the early 1990s the Iraqi Kurds were autonomous (with British and American help) and they had always been more effective soldiers than the Iraqi Arabs. The Kurds still suffer from tribal and clan divisions as well as corruption, but to a much lesser extent than the Arabs. Thus a disproportionate number of Western trainers are being sent to the Kurds, who are only about a fifth of the Iraqi population. The Kurds are considered reliable enough to work with Western commandos and protect ground control teams (that can call in air strikes). Kurds regularly assist the American and British commandos in carrying out their most dangerous tasks; reconnaissance inside ISIL territory.
The Iraqi Arabs resent this “favoritism” and envy the success of the Kurds (who are Moslems) in keeping Islamic terrorists out of Kurdish territory. Thus the Shia Arab dominated government blocks aid for the Kurds (especially weapons shipped in for all). Some Western nations have intervened and provided (via air transport) weapons to the Kurds despite protests from the Iraqi government. But the Kurds still found themselves less well armed than Iraqi Arab forces. Thus whenever you see Kurds using Iraqi Army vehicles it is usually because the Kurds captured them from ISIL (who have captured over a billion dollars’ worth of Iraqi Army weapons and equipment since Mosul was captured a year ago). The Kurds also became quite adept at improvising. Meanwhile the smaller (about 50,000 fighters) Syrian Kurdish forces are struggling to get the American government to get them off the international terrorist list (for supporting the Turkish Kurdish PKK rebels in the past). The Turks remain very hostile to armed Syrian Kurds even though these Kurds are responsible for killing a lot of ISIL gunmen who want to turn Turkey into a religious dictatorship. The Americans do recognize the Kurdish contribution. For example the U.S. has provided weapons and equipment for 12 Iraqi brigades. Three of those brigades are Kurdish and getting the stuff to the north (from Basra in the south) is still difficult (because of government reluctance to arm Kurds plus corruption and gangs that plunder imports).
In Iraq the Kurds there note that they have suffered lower casualties than the (about 8,500 with 14 percent killed) Iraqi Arabs and that’s a major reason for the better performance of the Kurds. In the Kurdish forces the leaders are more competent, much less corrupt and that means they look after the welfare of their troops. The most effective Iraqi Army units follow the same pattern but only about ten percent of Iraqi troops (including police commandos) operate on this level.
The success of the Kurds in the north is also a liability. That’s because the Kurds keep Islamic terrorists out of their territory by aggressively patrolling their borders and quickly responding to the presence of any terrorists who do get in. That requires the attention of the majority of Kurdish military personnel. Thus as good as they are there are not enough Kurdish troops available to bail out the many hapless Iraqi Army units. The Kurds have made it clear that they will slowly advance in the north and push ISIL forces back into Mosul. When, and if, the Iraqi Arabs do the same from the south, the Kurds will work with the Iraqi Arabs to push ISIL out of Mosul. So far the Kurds have been more successful north of the city than the Iraqi Arabs have been to the south.
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