CHAPTER II: Universal and Enduring Techniques and Procedures to Support Tactical Operations in Afghanistan (Desert Environment)

The desert is harsh; living conditions can be extremely uncomfortable; the desert can easily kill an unprepared soldier. The desert can pose a constant challenge to every soldier, and each must be physically, mentally, and professionally prepared to meet this challenge.

INTELLIGENCE

• Distances require longer lead times for reconnaissance and surveillance planning. Effective reconnaissance takes time.
• To confirm the intelligence template, if possible, reconnaissance must identify (six digit accuracy) approximately 80 percent of the enemy antitank systems.
• Scouts are reconnaissance patrols, not combat patrols, and should attempt to gain information through stealth.
• Consideration should be given to conducting reconnaissance during periods of limited visibility.
• Very few civilians are encountered in desert operations, and information they give should be treated with caution.

MANEUVER

• When moving in the desert, cover can only be provided by terrain masking because of the lack of heavy vegetation or manmade objects.
• Because there is little vegetation in the desert, strong shadows are readily observed from the air. Disrupt shadows by altering the shape of equipment, using the correct angle to the sun to minimize shadow size and to cause shadows to fall on broken ground or vegetation whenever possible.
• Dig in equipment and use overhead cover or camouflage nets to reduce shadows.
• Move vehicles and equipment as the sun moves.
• Shade optics to prevent shine.
• Open terrain and predominantly clear atmosphere generally offer excellent long-range visibility, but at certain times of the day it may be limited or distorted by the effects of heat.
• The ideal observation should have the sun behind it and be as high as possible to lessen the effects of mirages and heat radiation from the ground.
• Stake out your target line/engagement area (trigger point). This will prevent soldiers from engaging targets beyond the maximum effective range of the weapon system.
• Observation of fires may be difficult. The lack of visible terrain features distorts the ability to make range estimations.
• When preparing defensive positions, use every available means to know how far you can observe in front of your positions.
• The enemy can see just as far as you can. Inspect your position from an enemy point of view.
• Light and noise at night may be seen or heard from miles away, so strict light and noise discipline are necessary.
• Sand and dust reveal movement in the desert. It is best to move at night. This includes resupply as well as tactical movements.
• There are fewer terrain features in the desert. This hinders navigation and exposes friendly forces to the enemy.
• Take advantage of the least considered features, such as wadis, to conceal movement.
• The enemy will try to attack with the sun low and behind him in an attempt to dazzle the defender.
• Always camouflage positions.

FIRE SUPPORT

• Firing tables at altitude are inaccurate and need to be redone.
• Artillery ammunition storage and handling is very important in a dry, hot environment.
• Very hot ammunition will affect the ballistic solution, which will cause the round to impact long or short of its intended target.
• Digging in storage positions for ammunition will keep it cooler.
• Illumination or smoke rounds can be used to reorient maneuver forces.

MOBILITY/COUNTERMOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY

• When natural obstacles are not available, units should use linear obstacles to stop enemy movement.
• Minefields must be rapidly laid over large areas to be effective.
• The enemy will try to attack with the sun low and behind him in an attempt to dazzle the defender.
• Employ “basic loads” of Class IV (sand bags, pickets, etc.) with all vehicles to expedite digging in.
• In the desert environment, camouflage and dispersion are a necessity for all forces.
• Employ reverse slopes as much as possible and camouflage frontal parapets for individual/crew positions. This avoids obvious bunker positions being easily seen and destroyed by direct fire.
• Extended depth and dispersion of vehicles will enhance chances of survival.
• Armored vehicles survive longer when dug in.
• Use of dummy positions can conceal operational plans to deceive the enemy as to the real location of potential targets, such as fighting positions or trains areas.
• Air instability is most likely to cause quick, vertical, and irregular dissipation of an agent, leaving the target area relatively free of contamination quickly.
• Chemical weapons used during the heat of day are normally persistent nerve or blister agents.

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

• Medical support in the desert environment is challenged by remote locations.
• In a nonlinear desert defense, enemy and friendly units may be intermingled, especially in poor visibility.
• Medical treatment and evacuation will become more critical in the desert. The effectiveness of the combat lifesaver program has been proven.
• Medics must constantly re-certify and train those who are designated as combat lifesavers. The standard should be at least one lifesaver per squad.
• Rehearse how your unit will identify, treat, and evacuate casualties. This is as important as how you will fight.
• When not in use, keep weapons covered. Even though weapons are covered, they may still have sand on them. Clean the weapon frequently so it will be ready when needed.
• PMCS in the desert is absolutely essential. Left unattended, sand and wind will rapidly destroy the most basic piece of soldier gear.
• Sand clogs fuel lines and wears out tires and other rubber and plastic parts faster. It also seeps into engines and cooling systems. This results in overheated engines that can cause sudden and catastrophic failure.
• Food service organizations require intense supervision. Current menus must be augmented with fresh fruit, vegetables, and breads to provide soldiers the roughage and nutrients they need.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

• Desert evenings can be extremely long or short. Leaders should be concerned with EENT, BMNT, and percentage of illumination. These factors will be extremely important when conducting night operations.
• Dry desert conditions can, at times, reduce radio signal strength and create unforeseen blind spots, even in aircraft operating nap of the earth.
• FM communications may be degraded due to dead spots caused by heavy concentrations of minerals close to the surface. Establish firm procedures for constant control, either by radio or through liaison.
• Ensure that all know the commander's intent and rehearse battle drill so that actions are understood even in the absence of orders.

A. Background. Although GIs in World War II and Korea experienced their share of mine incidents, U.S. forces in Vietnam routinely faced the threat posed by mines and ambushes along their LOCs. Soldiers learned through trial and error to operate in this difficult environment. The experience produced many useful lessons learned. Commanders can take steps to significantly reduce mine losses. Appropriate tactics, combined with an aggressive training program for all personnel in mine warfare, proves to be an effective means of reducing casualties and equipment losses. To understand the threat, it is necessary to understand the enemy. His characteristics may include the following:

• He is as smart as you and extremely imaginative.
• He is part of the environment and culture.
• He is motivated to kill you.
• He is politically aware and will exploit the U.S. news media.
• He will wait until you have become complacent.

B. Countermine Tactics and Techniques

    1. The Environment

    Mines are cheap, easy to manufacture and deploy, and provide an effective countermeasure to a modern force. Countering mines increases the logistics burden on a force – from the necessity to carry additional equipment and clearing personnel to the need for additional medical and mortuary services. Mines that wound rather than kill are more efficacious since every wounded soldier ties up many support and medical personnel. Mines also rob a track or wheeled force of its high-speed mobility and reduce the rate of movement to the speed of a cautious sapper. For these reasons, the problem of countering mines will remain a constant for units in Afghanistan.

    In Afghanistan, the Russians buried and dropped about 10 to 12 million mines (some estimates are as high as 15 million) in the ground. “Minefields laid by the Soviets and the previous Afghan government forces were generally recorded and catalogued according to military procedures,” reported the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) in 1994. “However, the vast majority of mines laid by the mujahideen were not recorded or laid to any specific pattern. Moreover, the records lost much of their significance as the many areas were fought over, and won and lost by both sides during the war.” All mine-clearing activity in Afghanistan has been suspended since 12 September 2001according to the U.N. Mine Action Program.

    2. Types of Landmines

    The following is a listing and brief description of the types of landmines likely to be encountered in your operational area.

• Blast Warheads. Blast warheads are simple to manufacture. They use simple fuzes, such as pressure triggers and tripwires. Presently, there is a large stockpile of these types of mines worldwide, and they have been and will be used in all levels of conflict.
• Shaped Charges. These are also referred to as “hollow mines.” They are simple to manufacture, have a variety of fuzes (including magnetic), and can penetrate armor in a range of 60 mm to 250 mm. Typical armor penetration is 90 mm.
• Scatterable. A key characteristic of these landmines is rapid emplacement. They have a variety of fuzes, mostly non-contact. These can be deployed via helicopter, fixed-wing aircraft, artillery, and ground-vehicle dispensers. They permit efficient minefield emplacement, but do not allow adequate documentation of mine location.
• Side-Attack. This mine is placed by the side of a road or track where a vehicle may pass. It will fire a shaped-charge into the target's side. It can penetrate armor up to 150 mm. It is also known as a horizontal action mine or off-route mine.
• Top-Attack. These mines are directed specifically at the top of a tank (turret) where the armor is weakest. Top-attack mines can also be used against personnel. These can be air-delivered or hand-emplaced. The hand-emplaced version uses acoustic sensors to recognize the approach of an armored vehicle and then activates an IR homing sensor. The munition detonates above the target and sends a shaped-charge downward.
• Anti-Personnel. A mine designed to injure or kill personnel. These are activated by several means, the most common being activation by pressure, pull, or command detonation. The necessary pressure or pull can be as little as 2.2 pounds (1 kg).
• Anti-Air Mines. The most common types in this category are anti-helicopter mines, due to the relatively slow speeds and hovering ability of rotary-wing aircraft. The anti-helicopter mine can detect an aircraft up to a distance of 3.7 miles (6 km). The mine can use an IFF (identification friend or foe) system to decide whether to attack the aircraft.
• Anti-Tank. A mine designed to disable or destroy vehicles and/or tanks. The explosive can be activated by many types of fuze mechanisms, the most common being pressure, tilt-rod, influence, or command detonation.

    3. Mine Activation Methods

• Trip-Wire (pull). A wire attached to one or more mines to increase the activation area. Pressure on or breaking of the tripwire will activate the mine fuze. A tripwire is normally attached to a bounding or fragmentation-type mine. Often employed in a nuisance minefield, it is also used in the forward rows of anti-tank, anti-personnel, and mixed minefields.
• Pressure. Some of the more common and older mines use pressure-sensitive plates or hammers to initiate the explosive. Pressure fuses are used for both anti-personnel and anti-tank mines.
• Acoustic. Utilizes microphones to detect the approach of a vehicle. Usually the primary sensor will “awake” a secondary IR or laser sensor.
• Infrared Sensors. Once activated, the IR sensor detects and tracks the target until engagement is complete.
• Tilt-rod. With this type, there is a post or pole normally attached to a fuze mechanism on the top of a mine. Pressure against the tilt rod activates the charge by breaking or releasing a mechanical retaining device, thereby initiating the detonation chain.
• Influence/Proximity. Activation of the mine is caused by the magnetic influence of a vehicle's mass. Employed primarily against vehicles and ships. These mines include infrared, magnetic, acoustic, and seismic.
• Command-Detonated. This has the ability to be detonated remotely.
• Double Impulse. This is usually an anti-tank mine that requires two separate pressures on the fuze to set off the detonation chain.
• Chemical-Friction Fuze. This has a fuze in which substances are separated until required for action. After they are brought into contact and unite chemically, an explosion is produced.

    4. Route Clearance Techniques

    Although GIs in World War II and Korea experienced their share of mine incidents, U.S. forces in Vietnam routinely faced the threat posed by mines and ambushes along their LOCs. Soldiers learned through trial and error to operate in this difficult environment. The experience produced many useful lessons learned. Commanders can take steps to significantly reduce mine losses. Appropriate tactics, combined with an aggressive training program for all personnel in mine warfare, has proven to be an effective means of reducing casualties and equipment losses. Vietnam and Somalia demonstrated that route clearance must be treated as a combined arms combat operation to ensure success. Three proven techniques are available to clear a route: deliberate sweep, hasty sweep, and mine reconnaissance.

• The Deliberate Route Clearance. The techniques described here for the deliberate sweep represent an “ideal” case and must be adapted to available resources and conditions. If the situation permits, the sweep should be conducted when a road is initially opened for traffic and, if possible, every morning thereafter. An infantry company team, with an attached tank platoon (with mine rollers) and a reinforced engineer platoon, and supported by preplanned artillery and gunship helicopters, is normally required for a deliberate route clearance. A reserve should be held at battalion level, ready for immediate commitment. The company team performing a deliberate route sweep should advance astride the main supply route (MSR) in an inverted “v” formation. Dismounted infantry platoons, each with an attached combat engineer team, move along the flanks while carefully searching for wires and other signs of command-detonated mines or ambushes. The two platoons should be far enough ahead of the sweep team on the road to investigate suitable sites for an individual to observe the sweep team and activate a command-detonated mine. If the platoon is near a tree line, a security team should sweep the tree line ahead of it. The effectiveness of this flank security as a countermeasure to command-detonated mines can be significantly increased by following each platoon with an up-armored bulldozer fitted with a single tooth ripper.
• The Hasty Route Clearance. As an alternative, a hasty sweep can be conducted daily prior to the beginning of convoy operations when it is urgent that traffic use the road. In a hasty sweep, the mine detector operators walk at a normal pace sweeping back and forth. Suspicious areas should be thoroughly checked. A mine reconnaissance can be used in place of a hasty sweep in some situations. Prior to opening the MSR to daily traffic, a small engineer team may drive over the route looking for any visual evidence of mining activity on the road. A dismounted team should thoroughly sweep any suspicious areas.
• Mine Reconnaissance. The mine reconnaissances performed in Somalia (in January 1993) were augmented with commercial infrared cameras. Infrared cameras proved very effective at finding buried mines on roads during certain times of the day from a standoff of approximately 100 feet. However, performance may be degraded by weather conditions and vegetation. The need for hasty sweep and mine reconnaissance procedures are used because the “100-percent solution” is not always feasible, and some reasonable amount of risk must be accepted. The commander must determine the proper balance between risk and requirements.

    5. Mine Detection Techniques

    Although it will not be possible to eliminate all casualties or equipment damage due to mines, there are steps that can be taken by commanders to reduce these incidents to a minimum. Appropriate tactics, combined with an aggressive training program for all personnel in mine warfare, is an effective means of reducing casualties and equipment losses.

• Observe people along the MSR. When a normally crowded area is abandoned, increased alertness is appropriate. Children, when rewarded, may provide constant observation between spaced outposts, as well as show friendly personnel where the militia has placed mines. Occasionally, the area immediately over the mine is swept with a brush, therefore breaking the continuity of wheel tracks left in the dirt. Roadblocks are also frequently mined and/or booby-trapped.
• Mine detection dogs may be employed in some situations to supplement route-sweeping teams. If employed, the handler and the dog must be viewed as an indivisible element. The dogs are capable of working 3 to 4 hours in moderate climatic conditions, and will require special veterinary support to retain their effectiveness. In order to conduct sustained operations, multiple teams will be required. Their handlers will be able to provide other employment recommendations.
• Do not take for granted that a road is cleared when it passes through a friendly village or outpost.
• If a mine is detonated, security must be established simultaneously with the care of the wounded.

    6. Countermine Techniques and Protection

• Cap all road repairs with quick setting concrete or asphalt to prevent the laying of mines in the loose gravel that is often used to fill potholes. This technique was used effectively in Vietnam.
• Use 2-1/2 ton and 5-ton vehicles to lead convoys, with a manned HMMWV in the second or “slack” position. These type vehicles are significantly safer in the event of a mine blast than are light-wheeled vehicles, such as the HMMWV.
• If possible, vehicles should have two cables to expedite recovery in case of a mine strike – one on the front and one on the rear. The rear cables should be attached to the lower mounts. This technique allows crews to hook up to a disabled vehicle without touching the ground.
• Increase crew survivability through enhancements, such as sandbagging vehicles, wearing seat belts, and placing 25 gallons of water in each tire to mitigate blast damage. Keep speed below 25 mph; after a mine detonation, there will be a vehicular accident.
• The use of the KEVLAR blanket has proven to be a tremendous anti-mine reactive countermeasure. It minimizes the explosion’s impact and reduces flying debris.
• Establish a mine information center that would be responsible for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information on the mine threat.
• Mark the MSR with asphalt products that make any digging immediately obvious. This technique was employed effectively in Vietnam using Peneprime.
• Consider offering money in coordination with a PSYOP campaign for information on the location of mines and for weapons and ordnance turned in by the local population.
• During planning, consider both mining and ambush by insurgents.
• Roads previously cleared should not be considered secure unless constant surveillance has been maintained.
• Secure all loose articles; they can become high-speed projectiles in the event of a mine detonation.
• Place two layers of sandbags on the floor of the vehicle cab and bed. Cover the sandbags with heavy conveyor belts or rubber matting to reduce secondary fragments.
• Do not put rocks in a sandbag; they may become secondary missiles in the event of a detonation.
• Non-ballistic windshields should be sandbagged down. Place sandbags on the hood above the dash to cut down on flying metal or glass.
• Strive for uniformity of appearance between vehicles. Cross-load key personnel and equipment.
• Follow tracks of the vehicle ahead, but avoid old tracks since they could be mined.
• Have hatches open on armored vehicles to vent pressure pulse.
• Rehearse unit-developed battle drills for actions in the event of a mine detonation or enemy ambush.
• Disperse after a mine incident, establish security, and clear the area with a sweep team. Do not cluster around; establish security.
• Many units establish a procedure for mine sweeps and then never deviate from it. This action has the advantage of assuring the commander of a thorough, well-controlled sweep. However, it also gives the enemy the advantage of being able to predict movements. He is then able to place his mines to inflict maximum damage.
• Do not take for granted that a road is cleared when it passes through a friendly outpost.
• A careless attitude breeds poor security. The militia will observe this and strike a unit when its guard is down. Likely ambush places must be physically checked. Dispersion and good firing positions must be taken up during halts.

    7. Reporting

    A spot report to the intelligence officer (S2) should be made immediately upon discovery or detonation of any mine. It is important that the spot report contain an accurate location (coordinates) of the incident. A written report containing all facts and commander's comments should be forwarded to the operations officer (S3) within 24 hours of the incident. If possible, sketches of the site showing where the mine was or a view of the buried mine should be included. Any recovered intelligence materials should be sent to the S2 in 24 hours.

    8. Neutralization

    When a mine or firing wires are detected, move all personnel except one man at least 100 meters from the area. He should immediately search for lead wires (all ordnance, including pressure fuzed AT mines can be rigged for command detonation). If found, they should be cut one at a time and shunted. One man attaches firing wire to wires leading into the road, being careful not to disturb the wire or pull it, then moves to a safe position and tries to fire the mine electrically. Remember that AP (antipersonnel) mines may be placed along the firing wire to protect it. If the mine does not detonate or demolition in place is unacceptable, sweep along the wire (one man) toward the road until the mine is located, and remove the mine from the MSR using an A-frame and grapnel. If unable to locate the mine, set a row of charges on the road and blow them all. After the mine has been detonated, carefully attach a piece of wire or rope to the end of the wires leading away from the road. If an armored vehicle is available, play out the wire or rope attached to the firing wires and pull by hand at a safe distance. Do not pull directly on the wires or probe around the wires. This same procedure may be used for wires leading to the road. If unable to pull the wire out completely, get an armored vehicle to run down the wire to its end.

    Common practice is to “blow in place” any enemy mine that has been detected. This will result in a large crater that must be backfilled and capped. Whenever possible, attempt to extract mines located on an MSR. Use approximately 150' WD-1 wire or parachute cord and an A-frame. Look out for stacked mines and anti-handling devices/booby traps. This removal can be accomplished off to the side of the road with little danger for destruction. After removing a mine from a hole, recheck it for other mines using mine detectors and probes. If multiple mines are to be removed from an area, they should be moved to a single point for demolition; this will save both time and demolition. Removing mines in this manner allows the road to be reopened immediately; eliminates the necessity of repairing a crater; and denies the enemy an excellent location for a mine – a recently repaired road crater. After neutralizing the mine, the hole should be checked again by a mine detector and a prober in case the enemy placed more than one mine in the hole. Also, a vigorous campaign should be conducted to inform users of the road not to leave metallic trash on the MSR.

    Always assign a team to the same section of road, as it has been found that efficiency increases as team members become familiar with the condition of the surface and areas of repeated incidents on their part of the road.

    Increase the size of the basic sweep team to include four primary detectors which sweep the width of the road. If a positive reading is obtained, the location is marked and the probers start searching the area with the assistance of two backup detectors. By using these additional mine detectors, the primary detectors can remain together and continue sweeping, ensuring complete and continuous coverage of the road.

    Sweep with multiple teams, one starting at each end, and pairs of teams diverging from intermediate start points along the MSR and working toward each other. The teams can be inserted by helicopter.

    9. Mine Countermeasure SOP Items

    The following TTPs maximize force protection and are essential to reducing soldier risk:

• Block off unnecessary routes.
• Limit to only daylight operations in areas of uncertainty.
• Treat cleared areas as suspect. A minefield is always a minefield ... even when cleared.
• Ensure every vehicle has a map with minefields marked.
• Post lessons learned in high traffic areas. Discuss and review at platoon level.
• Ensure new soldiers are briefed and oriented on unit sector.
• Weather changes requires re-proofing of lanes.
• Always wear kevlar and body armor.
• Ensure all radios have MEDEVAC frequencies pre-set on position 6 of SINCGARS.
• All unoccupied buildings, equipment, etc., will be treated as mined until cleared.
• Ensure every vehicle has engineer tape and mine marking material.
• Conduct monthly mine awareness refresher training.
• Incorporate lessons learned with daily risk assessment.
• Review current engineer mine database prior to all mounted and dismounted.
• Ensure commanders check engineer mine overlays for updates.
• Pair up new soldiers with experienced soldiers.
• Avoid road shoulders.
• Never touch a mine. Don’t give in to curiosity.

    10. Patrolling

    Patrolling is a requirement throughout the AOR. Units plan, coordinate, rehearse, and certify patrols to ensure the force protection of soldiers. The following TTPs are for all patrols:

• Review current engineer mine database prior to all patrols.
• Commander must check engineer mine overlay for latest updates.

    Dismounted Patrols

    Dismounted patrolling offers the least protection to soldiers, but is necessary in several areas due to restrictive terrain. Commanders can make use of the following techniques to reduce risk and increase force protection for dismounted patrols:

• Move only on previously cleared routes.
• Faction guide in front.
• Point man 15 meters behind faction guide.
• Interpreter in front part of formation to communicate with guide and locals
• Point man follows tracks of guide.
• Second soldier (slack man) scans ahead, pulling security.
• Ask local populace about mines.
• When in doubt, stop and retrace steps.
• Use faction guides for trails not frequently traveled.
• Squad moves slowly and deliberately, focuses on ground, and looks for turnaround points, conducting frequent halts. Stop and return if a mine is found.
• Mark mine.

    Mounted Patrols

• Mounted patrolling is the preferred method when METT-T allows.
• Guides are invaluable in negotiating local road networks.
• Factions proof lanes first, even if only with a heavy civilian truck.
• Re-proof roads after a thaw. Frozen ground inhibits effective mine removal/lane proofing.
• After proofing, the lead vehicle carries no soldiers in troop compartment.
• Drivers wear both lap and shoulder belts.
• All hatches are open to reduce blast injury in event of mine strike.
• 50-100 meters between vehicles.
• Medic with aid bag on every patrol.

    11. Extracting a Vehicle from a Minefield

    Extracting a vehicle from a minefield is conducted the same whether a mine strike has occurred or not. All movement should cease upon discovery that the vehicle may be in a minefield. It is important to note that casualties complicate these procedures, but do not supersede them. Use these techniques to prevent more casualties (vehicular and personnel) in the event of a mine strike:

• Stay in vehicle.
• Call for help.
• Exit vehicle from the top and climb down the rear.
• Step into vehicle tracks.
• Follow tracks out, looking for tripwires.
• Once clear:
  • Mark.
  • Record on map.
  • Report to unit.
• Vehicle recovery from minefield:
  • Engineers clear lane to, use all available tow cables to increase distance before towing.
  • Mounted tow shackles is a PCI check.
  • Make sure all shackle sets are complete.
  • If possible, vehicle should have tow cables on front and rear. Rear cables should be attached to lower mounts (allows crew to recover without touching ground).
  • Pull vehicle out at least two vehicle lengths before switching to towbar.
  • When M88 vehicle is available, use tow cable to maximum distance possible.
  • When towing vehicle after mine strike, chance of fire is greater due to possible damage to vehicle.

    12. Breaching Operations Under Fire

    The first technique for encountering a minefield is to try to find a bypass. Breaching minefields under fire is one of the most complex and challenging tasks in combat. The casualties and time delays incurred breaching threat minefields will severely degrade decisive offensive action.

    Breaching is a combined arms operation which is an integral component of any attack. Breaching an obstacle under effective fire is not normally possible because 30-60 minutes of manual breaching in these conditions normally results in catastrophic casualties. If hasty breaching is to be successful, the task force must reduce the obstacle in 7-10 minutes.

    13. Security During Mine Clearance

• Once it is determined when and where the mine demolition will take place, use your translators or CA personnel to notify the populace that mine clearance is being conducted and to stay out of the area. Tell them how long it will take so they will know when they can go back to work.
• Prior to the conduct of a clearance mission, conduct a reconnaissance to determine routes into the area, particularly those farmers would use.
• Consider putting bullhorns on your equipment list for mine clearance operations. The bullhorns (or air horns) can help alert civilians who accidentally wander into the area. If available, use a TPT loudspeaker team to explain the signals to the local populace.
• Clearly mark all routes leading into the area with signs notifying the populace that mine clearing operations are being conducted.

The use of tunnels as hiding places, caches for food and weapons, headquarters complexes, and protection against air strikes and artillery fire has been characteristic of the nature of the war in Afghanistan and other desert environments. An extensive tunnel system containing conference, storage, and hiding rooms, as well as interconnected fighting points, has been frequently encountered. These complexes present a formidable and dangerous obstacle to current operations, which must be dealt with in a systematic, careful, and professional manner. Additionally, they are an outstanding source of intelligence, as evidenced by the documents found during the clearing of tunnels during recent operations.

A. Tunnel Characteristics

The first characteristic of a tunnel complex is normally superb camouflage. Entrances and exits are concealed, bunkers are camouflaged, and even within the tunnel complex itself, side tunnels are concealed, hidden trapdoors are prevalent, and dead-end tunnels are used to confuse the attacker. In many instances, the first indication of a tunnel complex will be fire received from a concealed bunker, which might otherwise have gone undetected. Spoil from the tunnel system is normally distributed over a wide area.

Trapdoors may be used, both at entrances and exits and inside the tunnel complex itself, concealing side tunnels and intermediate sections of a main tunnel. In many cases, a trapdoor will lead to a short change of direction or change of level tunnel, followed by a second trapdoor, a second change of direction, and a third trapdoor opening again into the main tunnel. Trapdoors are of several types: They may be concrete covered by dirt, hard packed dirt reinforced by wire, or a “basin” type consisting of a frame filled with dirt. This latter type is particularly difficult to locate in that probing will not reveal the presence of the trapdoor unless the outer frame is struck by the probe. Trapdoors covering entrances/exits are generally a minimum of 100 meters apart. Booby traps may be used extensively, both inside and outside entrance/exit trapdoors. Typical trapdoor configurations found in Vietnam are shown in the sketches below.

The following typical elevation view of a tunnel entrance section illustrates use of trapdoors. Air shafts are spaced at intervals throughout the system.

Recognition of their cellular nature is important for understanding tunnel complexes. Prisoner interrogation has indicated that many tunnel complexes are interconnected, but the connecting tunnels, concealed by trapdoors or blocked by three to four feet of dirt, are known only to selected persons and are used only in emergencies. Indications also point to interconnections of some length, e.g., 5-7 km, through which relatively large bodies of men may be transferred from one area to another, especially from one “fighting” complex to another. The “fighting” complexes terminate in well-constructed bunkers, in many cases covering likely landing zones in a war zone or base area.

B. Tunnel Techniques

• A trained tunnel exploitation and denial team is essential to the expeditious and thorough exploitation and denial of enemy tunnels. Untrained personnel may miss hidden tunnel entrances and caches, take unnecessary casualties from concealed mines and booby traps, and may not adequately deny the tunnel to future enemy use.
• Each unit should designate tunnel teams. Tunnel teams should be trained, equipped, and maintained in a ready status to provide immediate expert assistance when tunnels are discovered.
• Careful mapping of a tunnel complex may reveal other hidden entrances as well as the location of adjacent tunnel complexes and underground defensive systems.
• Small caliber pistols or pistols with silencers are the weapons of choice in tunnels, since large caliber weapons without silencers may collapse sections of the tunnel when fired and/or damage eardrums.
• Personnel exploring large tunnel complexes should carry a colored smoke grenade to mark the location of additional entrances as they are found. In mountainous desert areas it is often difficult to locate the position of these entrances without smoke.
• Two- and three-man teams should enter tunnels for mutual support.
• Claustrophobia and panic could well cause the failure of the team’s mission or the death of its members.
• Constant communication between the tunnel and the surface is essential to facilitate tunnel mapping and exploitation.

C. A representative equipment list for a tunnel team is shown below:

• Protective Mask - one per individual
• TA-1 telephone - two each
• One-half mile field wire on doughnut roll
• Compass - two each
• Sealed beam 12-volt flashlight - two each
• Small caliber pistol - two each
• Probing rods - 12 inches and 36 inches
• Bayonet - two each
• Mity Mite Portable Blower - one each
• M7A2 CS grenades - twelve each
• Powdered CS-1 - as required
• Colored smoke grenades - four each
• Insect repellant and spray - four cans
• Entrenching tool - two each
• Cargo packs on pack board - three each

D. Tunnel Exploitation and Destruction

• The area in the immediate vicinity of the tunnels is secured and defended by a 360-degree perimeter to protect the tunnel team.
• The entrance to the tunnel is carefully examined for mines and booby traps.
• Two members of the team enter the tunnel with wire communications to the surface.
• The team works its way through the tunnel, probing with bayonets for booby traps and mines and looking for hidden entrances, food and arms caches, water locks, and air vents. As the team moves through the tunnel, compass headings and distances traversed are called to the surface. A team member at the surface maps the tunnel as exploitation progresses.
• Captured arms and intelligence documents are secured and retrieved for destruction or analysis.
• Upon completion of exploitation, cratering charges or other available explosives are placed at all known tunnel entrances to seal each and prevent reuse by the enemy. If time or materials are not available for immediate closure, CS-1 Riot Control Agent can be placed at intervals down the tunnel at sharp turns and intersections. It must be emphasized, however, that the denial achieved by the use of CS-1 is only temporary in duration and used until demolitions are available to completely destroy the complex.
• Tunnels are frequently outstanding sources of intelligence and should, therefore, be exploited to the maximum extent practicable.
• Since tunnel complexes are carefully concealed and camouflaged, search and destroy operations must provide adequate time for a thorough search of the area to locate all tunnels. Complete exploitation and destruction of tunnel complexes is very time consuming, and operational plans must be made accordingly to ensure success.
• The presence of a tunnel complex within or near an area of operations poses a continuing threat to all personnel in the area. No area containing tunnel complexes should ever be considered completely cleared.
• Current chemical denial methods are only temporarily effective against tunnel complexes. Test results to date indicate that CS-1 effects should last about seven days.

E. Tunnel Flushing and Denial

• In some areas the combat situation will permit a hasty search for hidden tunnel entrances, but either lack of time or enemy occupation of the tunnel will not permit searches by a tunnel team.
• In this case the Mity Mite Portable Blower (RVN, MACV 1965) can be employed to flush the enemy from the tunnels using burning type CS Riot Control Agent grenades (M7A2). In addition, the smoke from the grenades will, in most cases, assist in locating hidden entrances and air vents.
• After flushing with CS grenades, powdered CS-1 can be blown into tunnel entrances with the Mity Mite to deny the tunnel to the enemy for limited periods of time. It must be remembered, however, that this method will only be effective up to the first “firewall.”

F. Dangers

Dangers inherent in tunnel operations fall generally into the following categories and should be taken into account by all personnel connected with these operations:

• Presence of mines and booby traps in the entrance/exit area.
• Presence of small but dangerous concentrations of carbon monoxide produced by burning-type smoke grenades after tunnels are smoked. Protective masks will prevent inhalation of smoke particles, which are dangerous only in very high concentration, but will not protect against carbon monoxide.
• Possible shortage of oxygen as in any confined or poorly ventilated space.
• Enemy still in the tunnel who pose a danger to friendly personnel both above and below ground (in some instances, dogs can successfully detect enemy hiding in tunnels).

A. Morale Factors

In recent contingency operations, several soldier support issues have repeatedly been shown to be important factors that should be addressed during planning. It has been found that soldier morale is related to several key issues. These eight issues rate consideration when planning for a contingency operation (no particular priority or hierarchy is intended).

• MAIL: Troops need ongoing confirmation that all is well back home. Mail (including Internet mail) is more important than packages from home, although all mail is eagerly anticipated. The command should see to it that mail delivery is begun as soon as practical, both outgoing as well as incoming. Mail must be managed closely because it becomes another class of supply and a significant logistical challenge when many personal packages are sent to the theater.
• MESS: Troops tolerate cold rations for a while, a little longer in combat than in noncombat operations. If they can see no reason for the delay of hot meals, fresh fruits, vegetables, juices, and cereals with fresh milk, they expect them to be forthcoming.
• PAY: Troops need to know their pay is going to the right place, on time. They also need a small amount of money in theater for PX items when AAFES establishes operations. The pay policy should be established during planning and announced to the troops so they can plan accordingly.
• INFORMATION: Soldiers want to know what is going on in their unit, in neighboring units, and in the theater. They also want to know about world events and how their favorite sports teams are doing back home. Troops want to know that they can get home on emergency leave, if it becomes necessary.
• MEDICAL SUPPORT: Soldiers need to know that quality medical support is immediately available to them. Observations indicate that medical support should be modularly packaged and somewhat mobile, based on the mission, the threat, and the environment. Where human misery, despair, or carnage are prevalent, medical support should include both mental and physical wellness capabilities. Also, knowledgeable managers are needed at port operations elements to handle shipments of drugs (many of which require positive control) and medical supplies (some of which may require refrigeration, such as whole blood).
• RECREATION: Troops eventually have the desire to “let off steam” in sports competition or games. Reading materials, cards, and board games also give soldiers the opportunity to focus their thoughts away from the rigors of the mission or the environment. Videos of recent movies and sports events are also a consideration.
• PERSONAL HYGIENE: Troops should have a hot shower on a fairly regular basis, and expect it if they are not engaged in combat operations.
• BILLETING AND WORK SPACE: In combat, troops tolerate pup tents and fox holes. However, in a static, ongoing, noncombat operation, living and working environments should be improved somewhat as the operation progresses.

These are areas which have an immediate impact on troop morale – and which the command can address in planning. If the contingency becomes an extended operation, additional soldier support programs should be considered, such as R&R trips, Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (with live coverage of major news and sporting events), and in-country entertainment programs or concerts. These require coordination beyond the command's initial operations planning.

B. Tactical Factors

• No individual or team can practice or train too much or too often.
• Teamwork is the key to success and will only come through constant training and rehearsal.
• If you show confidence, your team will have confidence.
• Always have an alternate plan. Think ahead.
• If you lose your temper, it will affect your judgment. Keep cool!
• Don't be afraid to take advice from your team members.
• Realism must be injected into all phases of training.
• Conduct at least half of your training at night.
• Teams that have a good physical training program have fewer health problems.
• Have a pre-mission and post-mission checklist to ensure that nothing is left behind.
• Correct all personal, individual, and team errors on the spot.
• Use tact when reprimanding your personnel. If possible, take the man aside to criticize him. This enables him to react positively to the criticism, since he will not lose face, feel ridiculed, or lose self-confidence.
• Conduct English classes for your indigenous personnel, especially interpreters. Conduct classes for U.S. personnel in your indigenous team members’ language.
• Don’t set patterns in your operations.
• Never do the obvious.
• On patrol, stay alert at all times. You are never 100 percent safe until you are back home.
• Have team members write down tips and lessons learned, and collect and consolidate them at the end of each mission.

C. Uniform and Equipment Factors

• Wear desert camouflage BDUs on operations. Even when soaking wet at night, BDUs are remarkably “invisible” to NVGs.
• Do not use luminous tape. It is easily spotted at long distances with NVGs.
• Wear loose-fitting and untailored clothing on field operations. Tight-fitting clothing often tears or rips, allowing insects easy access to exposed parts of the body.
• Tuck your jacket into your pants. You can’t use the lower pockets because of your LCE anyway and, in contact, you can temporarily stuff expended magazines inside your shirt.
• Wear gloves to protect hands from insect bites, provide camouflage, and aid in holding a weapon when it heats up from firing. Aviator's nomex gloves work well.
• Sew in a section of VS-17 panel inside your fatigue shirt for use as an emergency daylight position marking signal to friendly aircraft. In the center of that, sew a 2"x2" piece of USAF “burn tape” for use as a nighttime position marking signal to AC-130 gunships (2"x2" is the size recommended by the AC-130 low-light/night television operators).
• If your mission requires long ropes, consider the use of 1" nylon tubing instead. It is lighter, more compact, and just as strong.

D. LBE/Ruck Tips

• Be sure that all snaps and buckles are taped. Do not use paper tape.
• Always carry a sharp knife or bayonet on patrol.
• Always wear your LBE buckled when not sleeping. If you're wounded, your teammates can drag you by your LBE shoulder straps.
• For survival, each individual should carry a cut-down MRE in his pants' cargo pocket, and one tube of bouillon cubes in the first aid pouch on his LBE. One bouillon cube dissolved in one canteen of water will provide energy for one or two days.
• Don't use 2-quart canteen covers to carry 30-round magazines. You can fit eight mags in one, but once you take the first mag out, the others rattle loudly and spill out easily. Use regular ammo pouches.
• Snap the snap link on your rucksack through the loop in the upper portion of your rucksack carrying straps or the frame so you won’t lose it during exfil when you snap it on a ladder or extraction fastrope.
• Insect repellent leaks and spills easily, so put it in a ziplock bag and isolate it from your other equipment in the rucksack. Also, squeeze air from the repellent container and screw the cap on firmly.
• Always use the water from canteens in or on your rucksack before using water in the canteens on your belt. This will ensure a supply of water should you ditch or lose your rucksack.
• Test the shoulder straps on the rucksack before packing it for patrol. Always carry some parachute cord to repair straps on patrol.
• Use a waterproof bag in the rucksack to protect equipment while on patrol.
• Camouflage your rucksack with black spray paint.

E. Night-Vision Goggles (NVG) Tips

• At night, carry NVGs in a claymore bag around your neck on your chest. This allows easy access and protects the NVGs from the elements.
• Always carry a spare battery for your NVGs.
• When in an OP at night, scan with NVGs only for a few moments every five minutes or so. If you scan continuously, you increase the chance of the enemy spotting your position. (When two persons using NVGs in the passive mode look directly at each other, they will see glowing “cat-eyes” caused by retro-reflectivity.)
• When moving at night, only every other man should wear his NVGs. Point and trail always wear NVGs.
• The point man wears a PVS-5/7 NVG and the slack (the man behind the point) uses a TIS.

F. Weapons Tips

• Never assume that your weapon is clean enough on an operation. CLEAN YOUR WEAPON DAILY.
• Always carry rifle-cleaning equipment on operations – bore and chamber brushes, cleaning rag and patches, cleaning rod with handle and tip, and a small vial of weapons oil. A shaving brush is very useful.
• When you fire your weapon, shoot low, particularly at night. Ricochets will kill just as well, and most people hit the ground when shooting starts.
• Use one magazine full of tracer during infiltration and exfiltration. If taken under fire during infiltration or exfiltration, the tracers can be used to identify enemy positions to friendly air support.
• The last three rounds in each magazine should be tracer to remind the firer that he needs a fresh magazine. Alternative: The last eight rounds are three tracers followed by five balls.
• Oil the selector switch on your weapon daily and work the switch back and forth, especially during rainy season. This will prevent the common occurrence of a stuck switch.
• Always carry your weapon with the selector switch on “safe.”
• Use a plastic muzzle cap or tape to keep water and dirt out of the barrel.
• To improve noise discipline, tape all sling swivels.
• Rig the jungle sling so it is easily adjustable (for easy transition from rappel/fastrope to carry/fire). Tape a spare field dressing to the sling at the stock, using a single strip of wide cloth tape with a quick-release tab.
• Check all magazines before going on an operation to ensure they are clean, properly loaded, and the springs are oiled and functioning. Magazine problems cause the majority of weapons’ malfunctions.
• Place magazines upside down in your pouches to keep out dirt and dust.
• Do not retrieve your first expended magazine during contact because it will consume valuable time.
• If you use a PAQ-4 aiming light on an M16A2 rifle, you must modify the handguard to allow the thumb switch to travel far enough to activate the light. Using the serrated edge of your bayonet, file down the area under the thumb switch (between the eighth and tenth ribs from the slip ring) about 1/4". This is not a problem on the M16A2 carbine because the handguard is smaller.

G. SAW Gunner Tips

• Silence ammo in plastic drums by making inserts from tablet-back cardboard covered with acetate. Cut to fit two per drum.
• When moving, use a 30-round magazine in the SAW. Attach a drum in the ORP or once in position in a hasty ambush.
• SAW drum pouches are tightly fitted and tend to pop open when you drop into the prone. Use cloth tape with quick-release tabs to prevent this. The 2-quart canteen covers are acceptable substitutes.

H. Claymore Tips

• Claymores are factory-packed “backwards;” i.e., to be emplaced from the firing position to the mine position, with the excess wire left at the mine. This is corrected by removing all the firing wire from the plastic spool, discarding the spool, re-rolling the wire in an “S” or “Figure 8" fashion, and replacing it in the bag to enable the mine to be emplaced first and the wire laid back to the firing position. The clacker with circuit tester attached is preconnected to the firing wire and stowed in the mine pouch. The unit commander must make the decision to either prime the mine before departing on the mission, or to only put the shipping plugs on the electric and nonelectric blasting caps to speed priming during emplacement.
• Dual-prime each claymore for both electric and nonelectric firing. The time fuses should be pre-cut for 30-, 60-, or 120-second delay for pursuit/break-contact situations. However, the burn time on the fuse becomes undependable the longer the fuse is exposed to wet/humid conditions.
• Waterproof your nonelectric firing systems.
• Carry the claymore in the rucksack so it is immediately accessible and so that after breaking contact, it can be quickly armed and emplaced on the back trail (even while it is still in the ruck) to delay pursuers.
• When placing claymores around your position (OP, ambush, RON, etc.), they should be emplaced one at a time by two men: one man emplacing the mine and the other standing guard.
• Never emplace a claymore in a position that prevents you from having visual contact with it.
• Because you only emplace a claymore where you can observe it, you may consider cutting your firing wire in half since you will not use more than 50 feet/5 meters of wire, easing emplacement and recovery and cutting weight.
• Emplace each claymore so the blast parallels the team, and the firing wire does not lead straight back to the team position from the mine. If the claymores are turned around by the enemy, they will not point at the team.
• Determine in advance who will fire each claymore and who will give the command or signal to fire.

I. Grenade Tips

• Make continuous daily checks on all grenades when on patrol to ensure that primers are not coming unscrewed.
• Do not bend the pins on the grenades flat. The rings are too hard to pull when needed.
• Fold paper tape through the rings of grenades and tape the ring to the body of the grenade. The paper tape will tear for fast use, while plastic or cloth tape will not. It also keeps the ring open for your finger, stops noise, and prevents snagging.
• All team members should carry a mixture of fragmentation, CS, and WP grenades on their belts for the following reasons:
  • Fragmentation grenades are good for inflicting casualties.
  • CS grenades are ideal for stopping or slowing down enemy troops and dogs pursuing your team and are effective in damp and wet weather, whereas CS powder will dissipate.
  • WP grenades have a great psychological effect against enemy troops and can be used for the same purpose as CS grenades. The use of CS and WP at the same time will more than double their effectiveness.
• Thoroughly train and test your indigenous troops in grenade-throwing, particularly WP. Not all of them might be adept at baseball-style throwing or be able to get much distance.
• Violet and red are the smoke colors most visible from the air.
• Notify aircraft before signaling with WP. Gunships or fighter-bombers may mistake it for a marking rocket indicating an enemy position and attack you.
• Camouflage smoke, CS, and WP grenades, using black or OD spray paint.
• Smoke grenades should be carried in or on the pack and not on the LBE. You do not fight with smoke grenades, and if you need one, 99 times out of 100, you will have time to get it from your pack.
• Each team should carry one thermite grenade for destruction of either friendly or enemy equipment.

Following are comments on desert operations made by Colonel Tackaberry, Commander, 24th Aviation Brigade, 24th ID(M), during Operation Desert Storm. Tackaberry’s peers and subordinates told him that putting helicopters in the desert could not be done.

“The plan was for the helicopters to remain at Dhahran Airport. But my heart and my gut said this was wrong," Tackaberry said. “We had to be where the Division was. If we were to be a maneuver brigade, we had to be responsive to them, not back there at some big airport. If we were to be a maneuver brigade, then we had to be there with the other maneuver brigades.”

Tackaberry studied a map and spotted a site called Thadj, about a 45-minute flight in a UH-60 north-northwest of Dhahran. It was merely an old, dirt airstrip in the desert, surrounded by nothing but, in Tackaberry’s words, “scorpions, viper snakes, cobra snakes, and sand.”

He was told the OH-58D couldn't make it; that the Army had trouble just keeping the Apache flying in the United States; that the UH-1 couldn't operate out there; and that the UH-60 couldn’t survive, that its blades and APUs would be eaten alive. “Now I grant you that we had problems,” Tackaberry admitted. “Within three weeks of getting there, we had our aircraft on the ground for two reasons: parts and menta1 attitude. But the parts began to come in, and we began to lick the mental problem. We didn't fight the desert, we learned to live in the desert. We did a Black Hawk phase check just 10 days after the first week of being out at Thadj. We pulled maintenance at 0400 in the morning, and sent the guys to sleep in the evenings. So we learned to live there and train there.”

“The harshest and most difficult flying I have ever done was in the desert,” Tackaberry added, “and it was done at night under NVGs -- a real credit to our training methods. We learned you can mature quickly in a place like that, then be ready to go to war.”

Flying in Afghanistan presents a list of difficulties: dust, primitive living and working conditions, and high altitudes in the region's extensive mountain ranges. When landing on soil or sand, helicopters are susceptible to brownout – thick clouds churned up by the rotors’ downdraft that can block a pilot’s vision and cause vertigo. Following are typical problems experienced by aviation assets during operations in a desert environment.

A. Blade Erosion. Blade erosion degraded mission performance. Blades made of composite materials to save weight and enhance survivability were literally melting under the hail of sand. Blade maintenance was difficult to perform in the field environment. The following blade protection maintenance problems were encountered.

    1. Rotor Blade Erosion. Helicopter rotor blades were being severely affected by erosion from sand and dust. The UH-60, in particular, experienced erosion problems that rendered main rotor blades unserviceable in as little as 25 flight hours if not treated with erosion protection. AVSCOM procured two rotor blade erosion kits for protection against the harsh environmental conditions in Saudi Arabia. The first kit was an interim kit using a polyurethane paint. A second preferred kit used polyurethane tape on the leading edge of blades. The application process was not extremely difficult, but conditions must be suitable and it is time consuming. The application was labor intensive. Taping developed bubbles which broke and filled with sand, creating an out-of-balance condition. The taping did not last long and was easily destroyed by rain.

    2. L-100 coating (Tail rotor). The application was labor intensive, required a clean environment, and was difficult to apply. The time required for application depended on temperature and moisture. If hot and dry, the coating would normally spread unevenly due to the drying speed, with approximately half the can being wasted. If cool and moist, more time was available for application. The coating did not last long, came off unevenly, and created an out-of-balance condition. Some tail booms were replaced due to vibration effects. The application/reapplication usually required the balancing/rebalancing of tail rotor blades.

    Special operating procedures developed to minimize sand ingestion/blade erosion.

• Hovering was avoided as much as possible.
• TADS/PNVS was stowed for landings.
• Run-ups were limited to approximately 5 minutes.
• ENCU and ALQ-144s were turned off prior to take-offs and landings.
• “Blind” shutdowns (no APU) were performed to minimize APU usage due to the number of APU failures.
• Prolonged ground operations were conducted at engine idle.

B. Aircraft covers. Extreme heat, dust, and blowing sand caused premature failures on critical aircraft components. Blowing sand renders glass and acrylic surfaces unserviceable. AVSCOM initiated a review of possible aircraft covers for use in high temperatures with windblown sand and dust. Units should take all issued covers and any available material or coverings that provide shade for conducting maintenance or protect components from blowing sand and dust.

C. Operations in heavy dust conditions. Brown-outs were a constant hazard. Recommendations:

• Saturate LZs/PZs with diesel or oil to minimize brown-out conditions.
• Purchase and field rubberized matting sections to construct improved landing zones.
• Augment engineers with tanker vehicles and dust control spray to provide the unit with internal dust control capability.
• Ensure aircraft engine and APU intakes have improved particle filtration systems.
• Rotor blades need improved erosion guards capable of sustaining operations in the sand.

D. Engine performance was degraded due to sand ingestion. Special procedures were developed to minimize sand problems.

• In-flight HIT checks were accomplished or, in some cases, not done at all.
• Take-offs were expedited; max performance take-offs were accomplished when possible.
• Landings (running) were made to the ground.
• Turbine engines and rotor blades were particularly affected, with the life expectancy of an aircraft engine reduced from 1,000 to 1,500 hours to as low as 40 hours.
• To reduce engine wear, the first initiative was to limit the exposure to take-offs and landings in the sand. While tough to do in the desert, landing areas were scrutinized to use the least sandy spots, and heavy use landing areas were improved with the use of diesel or slurry-tar mixture to reduce dust. Some aircraft, such as the UH-1 and AH-1, which lacked a particle separator, were restricted to hard-stand operations for training until improved particle separators were obtained and installed.

E. Night-Vision Systems. Although the night-vision devices/systems enhanced the capabilities of aircrews to fly in the night environment, the ANVIS 6 night-vision goggles (NVGs) proved inadequate for the SWA desert night environment.

• Low moon illumination - With moon illumination levels at 20-30 percent or less, the terrain contrast/definition was inadequate for NVG operations for most units.
• High moon illumination - With moon illumination levels at 85-100 percent, the NVGs had a tendency to “white out;” that is, shut down due to the brightness.
• Moon shadows - With moon angles of 23 to 60 degrees and illumination levels of 30 percent or greater, coupled with the moon positioned to the front or side of the aircraft (approximately 9 o’clock-3 o’clock position), crews could pick up shadows and use the contrast for terrain definition. However, with the moon to the rear quadrants (4 o’clock-8 o’clock position), the moon shadows either could not be picked up or were difficult to see. This caused terrain blending, making it extremely difficult to discern increases/decreases in elevation sloping, small buttes, and hills.

F. Training. Aircraft were restricted to a minimum of 150 feet during training for safety reasons. When the war began, pilots were expected to fly at altitudes of 50 feet and below. Pilots felt uneasy due to a lack of training at the lower altitudes. Night operations at low altitudes were extremely difficult in a desert environment without training.

G. Altitude problems. Terrain definition was extremely difficult, if not impossible, to discern at altitudes above 80 feet AGL due to a lack of terrain definition. At altitudes below 50-80 feet, AGL rises in terrain elevation are difficult to identify causing potential problems with flying into sand dunes. Many pilots used the IR searchlight as an aid to enhance terrain definition. The dilemma was, Do you fly low with an active IR source (hoping the enemy lacks the sophistication to pick up the source), or do you fly high (above the environment, hoping the enemy lacks radar coverage)? Some helicopters will have difficulty reaching altitude in mountainous regions.

H. Navigation

• Maps were old and lacked accuracy.
• The Doppler navigation system proved inadequate in the SWA desert environment due to a lack of terrain features and landmarks for waypoint updating.
• The LORAN navigation system was inconsistent (frequent loss of signal), and the update rate is too slow.
• The GPS navigation system (or one like it) is needed to provide accurate updates.

I. Aircraft Survivability Equipment

• ALQ-144/144As failed repeatedly. The bearings would fail due to sand ingestion. Mirrors were also broken due to flying debris.
• ALQ-156 flares went off inadvertently around approaching aircraft, microwave towers, or Patriot missile systems.
• APR-39 (all types) information was too confusing to interpret, especially during high workload tasking.
• APR-39(A)V1 had poor voice quality, talked too much, gave false alarms, and was difficult to interpret. Ground Surveillance Radars (GSR) would activate the APR-39(A)V1 as ZSU-23-4s. Many crews chose to disregard the system. Crews were not sure of ASE suite effectiveness.

J. AH-64 Desert Operations Lessons Learned

    Hellfire (HF)

• The HF missile system was extremely lethal when targets were hit. All targets engaged by the HF, to include the new sophisticated armor systems, were easily destroyed when hit.
• Specific engagement data was collected on 200 HF shots: 127 hit their intended targets, while 73 missed. Percentage of targets engaged that were hit/destroyed: 63.5.
• HF engagements were difficult to complete in a smoke, fire trench, rain, or fog environment.
• LOBL engagements were not as effective as LOAL engagements due to a backscatter problem. LOAL direct became the preferred method of engagement.
• A-model HFs were not as effective as C-model HFs.
• The A-model HFs would leave a cloud of smoke on departure when the temperature dewpoint spread was small, causing the crew to temporarily lose the missile.
• Some units cleaned their HFs after every flight to dislodge any rocks/pebbles from the canards/fins.
• Running fire (airspeeds above effective translational lift) was the preferred method of engagement. It was used to minimize sand/rock FOD problems.
• De-ice domes were not available in the majority of units.

    Rockets

• The MK66 MPSM rockets had high success rates out to extended ranges. One T-55 was destroyed by MPSM. MK66 HE rockets were not as accurate as MPSM.
• MK40 rockets are not very accurate.
• Rockets would not properly inventory; suspect poor contact between the launcher and the rocket. Umbilical cords (for remote fuze settings) were tightened to reduce the chance of interference with other rockets.
• Rocket pods were cleaned often to minimize sand problems.

    30mm Gun

• The 30mm gun systems were very lethal and destroyed targets at ranges out to 4 kilometers when accurate. One T-72 turret (rear portion) was penetrated by 30mm HEDP rounds.
• The 30mm gun system frequently jammed due to:
  • Sand ingestion.
  • Round casings lodged in feed mechanism.
  • Fuzes backed off of M789 rounds.
  • Drive motor seizures.
  • Broken carriers.
  • Loose feed chutes.
• Gun jams were minimized mostly by:
  • Preventive maintenance - cleaning on a continuing regular basis.
  • Reduced loads - loads of only 400-600 rounds minimized stretching and bending of flex chutes.
  • Accuracy - Outfront harmonization was used in one battalion and improved the accuracy for those gun systems.
• Uploading/Downloading:
  • 30mm loading took too long (as long as 2 hours).
  • Gun loader design is poor - holes were dug under aircraft in order to use loader.
  • Drive motors were too weak - should be upgraded.
  • Flex chute stretched, bent, and broke too easily.

    Sensors

• The sensors provided the capability to detect, engage, and destroy targets out to 8 kilometers.
• Smoke degraded the capabilities of the DTV and FLIR; however, the FLIR did provide the capability to engage some targets in smokey conditions.
• Detection ranges were sufficient.
• Target identification was difficult; crews had to move close to threats (within 2-3 kilometers) for FLIR identification, with slightly longer ranges for the DTV.
• Direct-view optics (DVO) were rarely used by the CPG.

    Night Vision Systems

• The AH-64 was the only Army aircraft capable of flying and fighting in the entire nighttime spectrum. When other aircraft crews were not flying due to low illumination levels, the AH-64 was engaging targets in the darkest of nights.
• The front seat pilotage using TADS is not adequate for night flight. A PNVS capability needs to be provided for both crews.
• Rain degrades the PNVS performance (provides uniform cooling).

    AH-64 Equipment Design

• The CPG heads-out display (HOD) is too small and provides insufficient clarity for target recognition in most cases. CPGs often ask the pilot for assistance on their video display unit (VDU) which is larger and has better clarity. The crews suggest removing the optical relay tube (ORT) and adding a larger display in the front seat, possibly with color.
• The ORT is a safety hazard in any crash sequence.
• The crew seats are uncomfortable on extended flights.

    Communications

• Crews had to rely on OH-58 aircraft to relay radio traffic due to the limited range of the fielded avionics package.
• Directionality - The positioning of antennas created blind spots to the front and rear of the aircraft. Aircraft occasionally had to be rotated to communicate with other crews and ground units.

K. UH/EH-60

    Weapon Systems

• The wind drag (outside aircraft) made the operation of the M-60D very difficult. The system cannot be stowed inside the aircraft once it is on the outside.
• The M-60D is difficult to load once it goes outside.
• Sand ingestion required additional maintenance time to clean the weapon system.

    Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE)

• Chaff dispenser was unreliable and not always available.
• Flares were positioned to activate directly downward, and coupled with low terrain flight altitudes, could degrade its effectiveness as a decoy.

    Equipment Design

• The field of view from the cockpit is too restricted.
• The aircraft does not have a cargo net system for securing internal cargo.
• The APU needs an IPS system.

L. OH-58D

    Aircraft Performance (General)

• Aircraft could not keep up with the AH-64 due to speed differentials.
• Power margins were minimal when flights were conducted at high PA/temperatures.

    Sensors

• Remote HF designations were successful, although a few laser problems were experienced.
• Detection ranges were adequate.
• Crews had to reposition within 1-4 kilometers to correctly identify targets as threat systems.

M. Aviation Maintenance Operations

• Maintain forward presence by jumping support bases forward. The goal was to provide one set FARP at all times while simultaneously maneuvering the bulk support forward behind the ground units.
• Need for increased mobility and flexibility. Vehicles and equipment had to hold up under the harsh desert conditions; and individual operators had to be able to use their equipment to its maximum potential under the worst conditions, requiring in-depth and extensive maintenance.
• Develop maintenance packages which combine a support package for the line troops.
• Maintenance package includes an armament team, airframe mechanics, and a technical inspector (TI). This package is designed to quickly repair on-site problems, particularly at the forward arming and refuel point (FARP).
• Provide a battle damage assessment and repair (BDAR) team to provide rapid aerial response to downed aircrews. BDAR team includes a helicopter to transport a test pilot, avionics repairman, airframe mechanics, TI, and a medic.
• Provide an OPCON aviation intermediate maintenance area (AVIM) contact team to provide minimum AVIM on-site support. The team requires no special test equipment or PLL. This team completes AVUM/AVIM maintenance, which requires a stable work area.

“The machine has made warfare ponderous but has also given it greater velocity . . . it is conspicuous that what the machine has failed to do right up to the present moment is decrease by a single pound the weight an individual has to carry in war.”

-- S.L.A. Marshall, The Soldiers’ Load and the Mobility of a Nation

The fighting capability of an infantry soldier is directly related to his load. There is a maximum individual load limit that cannot safely be exceeded if an infantry soldier is expected to accomplish his combat mission. The following examples demonstrate how important it is for commanders to understand their responsibilities for lead planning and load discipline.

• The weight a soldier can carry is based upon his weight, the climate, the terrain over which he will move, and the stress he has faced and is currently under.
• Units must consider the environment, weather, mission, and soldier requirements prior to initiating the mission with definitive items that compose the soldier’ load. Each mission will require a study of the essential items that are necessary for survival and combat operations.
• No amount of training can change the body’s reaction to carrying excessive loads. The commander’s involvement analyzing the situation and the level of risk involved is the key to carrying only what is mission essential.
• Vehicles will not always be available for the light fighter to carry his essential loads of ammunition, food, and equipment.
• The fighting load for a properly conditioned soldier should not exceed 48 pounds; the approach march load should not exceed 72 pounds; the weights include all clothing and equipment, either worn or carried.
• Overloading the soldier can get him killed. Develop a unit SOP which strictly limits what is carried on combat operations and exercises, and enforce those limits.
• Fatigue is the infantryman's life in the field. Without rest or support, fatigue can reduce an effective unit to a leaderless gaggle even in the most benevolent terrain. With rough terrain and bad weather, the effects of fatigue multiply exponentially.
• Soldiers carry extremely heavy loads even in warm weather. That weight slows movement down and fatigues the soldier faster than if the platoon went into combat with a lighter load.

Carry what is required for mission accomplishment, but allow a minimum of comfort items. Train your CSS operators to make up the difference. Leaders, beginning at the team level, should conduct good PCIs to enforce that the packing list is adhered to. A sample of a packing list is provided on page 44, including the weight of everything a soldier might wear or carry. In this suggested list, “worn” includes the uniform, boots, etc., not normally weighed. There are four configurations with this type of packing list and load:

Everything - Worn plus the rucksack and assault pack = 95 pounds

SAMPLE PACKING LIST

Total load of soldier with ruck, assault pack, LBE, K-Pot, weapon, and uniform would be approximately 95 pounds, not counting AT4, 2x 60mm rounds, Gortex, airborne items, or poly-pro underwear. Bear in mind, the idea is to drop rucks and operate during patrolling with assault packs or the fighting load, then come back to rucksacks during hours of darkness and set up ambush sites or resupply for missions.

SECTION VII: INTEGRATION OF SOF AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES

The contemporary operational environment (COE) timeline looks at shaping the battle area, deployment of forces to the area, decisive operations to achieve victory, and stability or support operations that follow. Those COE phases are not distinct events with clear bookmarks to evidence when one phase ends and another begins. They may be – and often are – both sequential and parallel.

Special Operations Forces (SOF) offer combatant CINCs capabilities that are not only rapidly deployable, but also uniquely flexible across the full spectrum of operations. SOF will be on the ground before any conventional force deploys. SOF can reinforce, augment, and complement conventional forces. SOF operate independently in missions that demand small, discrete, highly trained forces. Initially, in Afghanistan, SOF was the main attack while conventional forces were the supporting.

The key to effective SOF integration in conventional operations is the deployment and use of a Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE). The SOCCE is critical in teaching Army service leaders how to integrate with SOF. Aside from FID missions, SOF mission profiles also include unconventional warfare (UW), guerilla warfare (GW), direction action (DA), special reconnaissance (SR), and coalition support (CS).

The fusion of SOF and conventional fits neatly on the COE event timeline when operations shape the battle area, cover deployment, achieve a decisive goal, or maintain stability in the area.

SECTION VIII: MILITARY OPERATIONS IN URBAN TERRAIN (MOUT)

Hue City. Beirut. Mogadishu. Grozny. Since the end of the Second World War, the population of the world and its conflicts have increasingly moved from the rural countryside to modern cities and urban sprawl. The U.S. Army has found itself on this new battlefield, and greater training emphasis is shifting to these likely future conflicts. There is no end in sight to the Army’s increasing commitment to this role.

Buildings in the urban setting provide excellent cover against small arms rounds or concealment that masks sandbagging and other force protection steps taken by the defender. With the exception of downtown cities, buildings are usually separated by open streets and sidewalks that provide little to no cover for the attacker. On the other hand, excellent fields of fire are available for the defender, although engagement distances are almost always 100 meters or less. Because adjacent buildings are much closer than 100 meters to each other, seizing a foothold in one will probably require suppression or obscuration of several. For the defender, winning the MOUT fight requires making the fight as unfair as possible in the first place. A good way to do this is to defend from buildings that provide cover and concealment for friendly weapons, and fields of fire into streets and engagement areas that offer the attacker fewer targets.

For riflemen and team leaders, the fight is to seize a foothold in a given building and clear individual rooms. At the squad level, the fight is for a floor or a single small building. The platoon fight revolves around larger buildings and small city blocks. At all levels of this fight soldiers will be crossing open areas and securing footholds. The platoon level is the lowest level where we begin to see enough combat power to assault buildings, while still being able to suppress as well as provide all-around 360^o security. This fight requires coordination – coordination gained through fire control and distribution, sectors of fire, and fire and maneuver tailored to a MOUT environment. The team leader/squad leader fight frequently focuses on close quarter battle (CQB) tactics to clear rooms; to assault streets, the squad requires support from the platoon to be set up for success.

Generally speaking, there are three weapons systems that cause almost all casualties among units in the MOUT attack: mines and booby traps, indirect fire (usually 82mm mortars), and direct fire from small arms. Direct fire is commonly caused by:

• Direct fire at a soldier clearing a building, or fire directed at a stationary soldier inside a friendly-held building. Ricochets from the 5.56mm and 5.45mm assault rifles cause a high portion of direct fire casualties to the employing force.
• Enemy soldiers inside a building defending themselves from a friendly assault (friendly troops in the open).
• Enemy soldiers in a building engaging friendlies in the open. The friendly troops are attacking a different building, or are otherwise unaware of the source of the fire.

The enemy hits two or three out of every four casualties when they are not clearing or moving inside buildings. To reduce casualties and increase the chances for mission success, we must either:

• Avoid those areas where casualties are most likely to occur.
• If we can’t avoid them, spend as little time in them as possible.
• Implement TTPs to better protect soldiers moving through them.
• There are three steps at the platoon level to an attack in MOUT:
• Isolate the building.
• Secure a foothold.
• Clear the building methodically.

    Isolate:
    Isolate is the first step in seizing a building. Isolation is defined in FM 90-10-1, An Infantryman’s Guide to Combat in Built-Up Areas, as “seizing terrain that dominates the area so the enemy cannot supply or reinforce the defenders.” There are two ways, basically, to isolate a building: by completely surrounding the building on all sides, or with fire. Fire is easier, faster, and far more common. By advancing to the flanks of the building, units can use interlocking fire to prevent the enemy from reinforcing or retreating. If units do not do this, the enemy can easily reinforce the building under attack, or withdraw and fight another day if threatened. Isolation is very important if units are going to use second-story entry techniques and fight “top down.” The danger of top down fighting is the lack of logistics support and the possibility of the unit being trapped without supplies. Isolation of the objective allows units to use the terrain to their advantage. The defender is pushed out of his building, where he has cover and concealment, into the open where he has neither and can be easily destroyed. This requires good adjacent unit coordination and cross-talk. In limited visibility operations, it requires the use of NVGs and weapons’ sights to their full capability. The night, which makes it easy to approach and gain entry, makes it easier for the enemy to escape as well.

    Mortars are another way to isolate a building with fire. Close-in fires can prevent the enemy from moving in and around the objective. Units will still have to secure a position that allows them to observe the rear of the building to provide observed fires. If not, they will need ammunition to fire continuously, and should plan accordingly.

    Securing a foothold:
    First, identify the foothold by designating the entry point for the building. Next, identify the route from the last covered and concealed, or assault position, to the building. This is usually the shortest distance, immediately across the adjacent street, back yard, or alley. A critical step at this point is for the soldier to ask, From what enemy-held buildings can the enemy observe my avenue of approach?, then orient observation and fires on those points to break the mutual support between enemy positions. Being able to predict suspected enemy positions by reading the terrain is an important skill to develop.

    By looking at the avenue of approach to the entry point from the enemy perspective, it can be determined which buildings and suspected positions are the greatest threat. Sectors of fire can then be assigned that direct friendly shooters at the identified enemy-held buildings. The purpose behind assigning these sectors of fire is to allow the assault team to get that foothold of a room in a building. It takes time to identify the enemy buildings, designate sectors of fire, and make sure everyone understands the plan.

    Moving across an open area to assault a building is one of the most dangerous events in MOUT. In this case, remember the sequence “slow-fast-slow:”

• Slow, detailed planning with dissemination of the plan to squad and team leaders.
• Fast movement across enemy kill zones (supported by fire).
• Slow, thorough clearing of the enemy-held building. It is better to spend the time necessary while covered and concealed in a friendly building than out bleeding in the street.

    Breaching:

    There are two types of obstacles a soldier might face: existing and reinforcing. At the platoon level, the most common types of obstacles are (1) mined wire obstacles emplaced by the enemy outside the building, and (2) the doorway, window or wall a soldier must pass through to seize the foothold itself. The best way for a soldier to enter, ROE permitting, is to make a hole through the wall. Next best way to enter a building is through a window, with doors being the least preferred way. If the friendly- and enemy-held buildings are adjoining, “mouseholing” with demolitions is preferable; otherwise, AT4s, LAWs, or other munitions should be used from the safety of a building, rather than out in the open emplacing explosives by hand. Caution should be taken, however, when firing AT4s and LAWs from inside a building since they can bring the ceiling down on the firer’s head or set the room on fire, particularly in Afghanistan. An effective technique, and one used by Chechens in Grozny in 1994, is to task organize “teams” under an NCO. Using pair or volley technique, a breach can be rapidly made, and provides the enemy the least time in advance as a warning. Hollow charge weapons generally are not designed to breach walls, and one may not be enough. High-explosive warheads (such as those in the AT8, SMAW, and Carl Gustav) have a better ability to breach masonry. Main gun rounds from tanks are very effective.

    The breaching fundamentals SOSR (suppress, obscure, secure, reduce) will be helpful. Smoke grenades draw fire; at a minimum, the enemy can be expected to shoot blindly into the smoke cloud. Speed of movement and breaching minimize exposure times. Assault teams must move fast and stay dispersed. If possible, do not stack outside the entry point. Get inside as quickly as possible.

    Clearing methodically:

    Once a foothold in the building is seized, the tactical problem for the defender changes. If the enemy is smart and is willing to trade space for time, he may elect to withdraw and take up the fight again on the other side of the next street or suitable clear field of fire, or reoccupy the building after the attacking force moves on. If the enemy regards the building as key terrain and is willing to fight for it, the fight does not end until the enemy is destroyed in the building. The defenders inside will shift their attention away from the support by fire (SBF) across the street and toward the assault force as it clears from room to room. On the other hand, defenders of adjacent buildings now know where the entry point is, if they can see it. Follow-on assault teams “run the gauntlet” to reinforce the foothold. There must be a plan for how follow-on teams will enter the building, and a senior leader within the platoon should play “traffic cop” to maintain intervals and dispersion. Fires from SBF positions should shift off the building, but still must focus on identifying and suppressing the enemy and protecting friendly reinforcements. Elements isolating the objective have a difficult task as well, and must be prepared for brief sightings of fleeting targets as the enemy makes his escape. Some shooters should stay oriented on the building until it is completely secured. While many platoons have SOPs that require them to mark every window and door, in reality this never happens. Room-clearing teams, in the heat of battle, have other things to do. Marking cleared floors and cleared buildings is a must, but there should not be an unrealistic expectation of what clearing teams will accomplish.

Moving in MOUT

Many units are adept at clearing rooms using the “stack” technique. Correctly employed, stacks allow units to dominate the room with overwhelming firepower in minimum time. One by-product of this is that leaders like to “stack” outside on the friendly side of buildings so they can control their soldiers better. There is a fine line between stacking and bunching up. It is not uncommon to see 5-10 soldiers stacked behind every friendly-held building where perfectly good cover and concealment is available on the other side of the very wall they are leaning against. This makes soldiers extremely vulnerable to snipers and airbursts from 82mm mortar fires. Platoon and company command posts, reserve squads, and casualty collection points are some of the biggest offenders. Good forward observers are aware of this trend and will act accordingly. In the terrain of urban combat, buildings offer cover and concealment from enemy fire and observation. They are the best avenue of approach through a city. Stacking outside buildings and moving around exterior walls are techniques that offer speed, but by considering buildings obstacles to movement, soldiers are put at risk. A reminder to units: If you’re not doing anything, don’t do it outdoors!

One technique that can have a great impact on the ability to defeat the enemy in MOUT is second-story entry techniques or fighting “top down.” Clearing “top down” is an effective way to secure a building. Its chief advantage is that it keeps the attacker from being bottlenecked fighting up a stairwell and forces the enemy down to the ground floor and out into the open, rather than trapped in an upper floor where there is no alternative but to make a last stand. The chief drawback to second-story techniques is they are time consuming, and increase the time spent and vulnerability of solders in the open if buildings do not adjoin and soldiers are forced to use ladders or grapnels. Speed in getting inside a building may take precedence over entry onto an upper-level floor. If the enemy has the ability to observe the entry point, obviously assault teams will become extremely vulnerable. To clear “top down” requires detailed coordination. A unit must be able to secure the entry point from enemy fire. As related before, units attempting to fight top down and drive the enemy out into the street should take the time to cover enemy withdrawal routes with fire to prevent the enemy from escaping to set up a new defense.

Another caution in the top down technique is the possibility that the isolated force in the top down scenario may be in a trap where the entire building is destroyed to create the maximum number of casualties. IPB preparation is very important in MOUT.

Mortars in MOUT

Every potential foe on the planet watched CNN during Desert Storm, and saw what we did to the Iraqi forces. They also watched what happened in Somalia, and saw our nation's Achilles heel. Believe me, the lesson was not lost on them. They will fight us where they believe we are weakest....and they will fight us asymmetrically.

General Charles C. Krulak
Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Mortars are valuable in providing indirect fire support during military operations on urbanized terrain. Indirect fire by FA has often been unavailable to infantrymen and in city combat due to building mask and lack of effective observation. Mortars have some distinct advantages during MOUT. The use of multi-option fuzes and several types of rounds increases mortar fire versatility.

• Employment of Mortars. Mortars are often the primary indirect-fire weapon for forward units in the assault or defense of a built-up area. Mortars can provide obscuration, neutralization, suppression, or illumination fires.
• In the offense, proper mortar employment is vital to the success of any mission. Mortars provide the offensive-minded commander with the ability to change the defender's advantages of overhead cover and physical obstacles into disadvantages.
• Light enemy overhead cover can be defeated with a combination of the mortar's high angle of fire and multi-optional fuzes. This ability to penetrate overhead cover makes the mortar the ideal weapon to defeat enemy positions in buildings. The mortar round must be able to penetrate the roof and top floor since experienced city fighters do not fight from the top floor.
• Short fields of fire work to the disadvantage of the defender by limiting his engagement capabilities. The defender is also vulnerable to unrestricted mortar engagement.
• Mortar fires for rapid advance to a target area or for a systematic, building-by-building advance are identical except for the firing restrictions given the mortars and the mode of support they are placed in. During a rapid advance, mortars are normally in general support; during a systematic building-by-building advance, they are in direct support of the lead element.
  • The attacking commander should ensure that his mortars have between one-third and two-thirds of their target engagement area beyond the forward edge of the target to obtain the best possible fire support coverage.
  • Forward observers should initially be on key terrain overlooking the target or with the forward element of the attacking force to engage targets of opportunity. Exact locations for the FOs are locations that allow the best overall fire support for the commander.
• Delivery of Fires. Mortar fires are effective in the offense as well as in the defense. The indirect fires are extremely responsive. Mortars are well suited for combat in built-up areas because of their high rate of fire, steep angle of fall, and short minimum range. Mortar fires can be used to inhibit enemy fires and movement, allowing friendly forces to maneuver to a position of advantage. Effectively integrating mortar fires with dismounted maneuver is key to successful combat in a built-up area.
• Mortar fires are a critical and irreplaceable element of the rifle company's maneuver. They either kill the enemy or suppress his fire, and thus allow the assaulting riflemen to close and kill him.
• Mortar fires alone cannot destroy enemy armor, but contribute to the enemy's destruction through synchronized action. Long-range HE fires force enemy armor to button up and reduce its speed of advance. HE and WP fires separate tanks from their dismounted infantry support, leaving them isolated and vulnerable to anti-tank weapons.
• After the combined arms team wins the anti-armor battle, or is still fighting it around key engagement areas, friendly battalions face dismounted attacks by threat motorized infantry, day and night. The battalion commander uses mortar fires to dominate and destroy this enemy, while protecting and conserving the friendly force.

Positon Selection

Key considerations for the selection of positions include:

• The minimum range of the weapon.
• Terrain suitable for setting base plates.
• Dispersion and accessibility.
• Multiple firing sites and registration of each.

Mask and overhead clearance may initially be difficult to achieve due to a combination of building heights and minimum-range requirements. Position selection should be open enough to allow full coverage of the sector of fire without mask or overhead interference at minimum ranges. Often, parking lots or parks must be used to achieve required clearances.

The selection of mortar positions depends on the size of buildings, the size of the urban area, and the mission:

• The use of existing structures for hide positions is recommended (for example, garages, office buildings, or highway overpasses) to afford maximum protection and minimize the camouflage effort. By proper use of mask, survivability can be enhanced. If the mortar has to fire in excess of 885 mils to clear a frontal mask, the enemy counterbattery threat is reduced. These principles can be used in both the offense and the defense.
• Mortars should not be mounted directly on concrete; however, sandbags may be used as a buffer.
  • Use two or three layers.
  • Butt them against a curb or a wall.
  • Extend them at least one sandbag width beyond the baseplate.
• Rubble may be used to make a parapet for firing positions.
• Mortars are usually not placed on top of buildings because lack of cover and mask makes them vulnerable. They should not be placed inside buildings with damaged roofs unless the structure's ability has been checked. Overpressure can injure personnel, and the shock on the floor can weaken or collapse the structure.
• The problem of hard surfaces must be resolved when using parking lots. Mortars tend to bounce and be inaccurate unless baseplates are cushioned by sandbags or other soft materials. Carrier-mounted mortars are ideal for use on hard surfaces. Aiming posts can be placed in cans of dirt to keep them upright.
• The political climate may require that no-fire or limited-fire zones be set up to protect civilians, government buildings, and public utilities. Close coordination must be maintained between the forward unit elements and the mortar platoon to ensure no friendly troops are in the target area.

Communications

• An increased use of wire, messenger, and visual signals will be required. Wire should be the primary means of communication used between the forward observers, fire support team, fire direction center, and mortars since elements are close to each other.
• FM radio transmissions in built-up areas are likely to be erratic. Structures reduce radio ranges; however, remoting of antennas to upper floors or roofs may improve communications and enhance operator survivability. Another applicable technique is the use of radio retransmissions. A practical solution is to use existing civilian systems to supplement the unit's capability.

Magnetic Interference

In an urban environment, all magnetic instruments are affected by surrounding structural steel, electrical cables, and automobiles. Minimum distance guidelines for the use of the M2 aiming circle will be difficult to apply. To overcome this problem, obtain an azimuth to a distant aiming point. From this azimuth, subtract the back azimuth of the direction of fire. Index the difference on the red scale, and manipulate the gun until the vertical crosshair of the sight is on the aiming point. Such features as the direction of a street may be used instead of a distant aiming point.

Aiming Posts

Posts may be placed vertically in dirt-filled cans or ammunition boxes if the frontal area is covered by concrete or asphalt. Natural aiming points, such as the edges of buildings or lampposts, may also be used.

High-Explosive Ammunition

During MOUT, mortar HE fires are more heavily used than any other type of indirect fire weapon. The most common and valuable use for mortars is often harassment and interdiction fires. One of their greatest contributions is interdicting supplies, evacuation efforts, and reinforcement in the enemy rear just behind his forward defensive positions. Although mortar fires are often targeted against roads and other open areas, the natural dispersion of indirect fires will result in many hits on buildings. Leaders must use care when planning mortar fires during MOUT to minimize collateral damage.

• High-explosive ammunition gives good results when used on lightly built structures within cities, particularly the 120mm projectile. It does not perform well against reinforced concrete found in larger urban areas.
• When using HE ammunition in urban fighting, point detonating fuzes should normally be used. The use of proximity fuzes should be avoided because the nature of built-up areas will cause proximity fuzes to function prematurely. Proximity fuzes, however, are useful in attacking targets such as OPs on tops of buildings.
• During both World War II and recent Middle East conflicts, light mortar HE fires have been used extensively during MOUT to deny the use of streets, parks, and plazas to the enemy.

Other Considerations

When planning the use of mortars, commanders must consider the following:

• FOs should be positioned on tops of buildings so target acquisition and adjustments in fire can best be accomplished.
• Commanders must understand ammunition effects to correctly estimate the number of volleys needed for the specific target coverage. Also, the effects of using white or red phosphorus may create unwanted smoke screens or limit visibility which could interfere with the tactical plan.
• Mortar sections should plan to provide their own security.
• Commanders must give consideration to where, when, and how mortars are to displace in order to maintain immediate indirect fire support. Combat in built-up areas may adversely affect the ability of mortars to displace because of rubbling.

BOS Trends in MOUT

The following BOS reflect negative trends associated with CTC rotations in MOUT. Units should review these trends and use them to focus training. Focused training can assist in ensuring that soldiers are combat ready to overcome difficulties while fighting in a MOUT environment.

INTELLIGENCE BOS

• The intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is not specific enough for MOUT.
• Lack of a decision support template and timeline preparation hinder the planning process.
• There is limited intelligence focus on routes to the objective.
• The force ratio analysis is rarely done, if done at all.
• Identification of key terrain and fields of fire is not effective.
• Intelligence gathering and development of input for the planning process is not complete.
• Use of psychological operations and civil affairs operations are not planned.
• Identification of decision points and setting conditions for success are not emphasized.
• Units fail to get eyes on the objective to confirm the intelligence template.
• Little thought is given to intelligence collection from and care of civilians on the battlefield.

MANEUVER BOS

• The movement plan to the object is usually not well done.
• There is a lack of focus in the movement to the objective, resulting in significant casualties.
• Casualties in the movement prevent units from achieving mass on the objective.
• Units do not achieve mass at other decision points.
• There is a failure to isolate the objective and protect the force from counterattack.
• There is a lack of combined arms TTP for armor, aviation, and close air support for urban combat.
• Uncoordinated maneuver and overwatch are more common in the urban fight.
• An unclear doctrinal base confuses units about correct procedures for clearing rooms.
• Marksmanship at all levels is poor with the exception of some special operations units.
• There is confusion among units as how to delineate inside from outside battlespace.

FIRE SUPPORT BOS

• Use restrictive rules of engagement in dealing with collateral damage and associated urban combat effects.
• Units have problems with allocation of resources and positioning of fire support assets.
• Poor use of precision-guided munitions in units.
• Suppression of enemy air defense for assembly areas is poorly planned.
• Units poorly use counter battery fires in urban conditions.
• Q36 are not being effectively used against enemy mortars.

MOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY BOS

• Unit movement to the objective is not well done.
• The operation orders do not properly allocate engineer resources for the urban fight.
• There is usually little unity of the engineer effort.
• Units are not effective in suppress, obscure, secure, and reduce (SOSR) at all levels.
• Engineers are attrited prior to the objective.
• Lack of eyes on the objective (scouts/aviation) prevent identification of obstacles.
• Extensive use of smoke is needed to mask movement.

COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS

• There is a lack of synchronization across the board in the battlefield operating systems.
• Units do not effectively locate their command and control nodes.
• Battalion task force is overloaded with requests from higher.
• Wargaming and course of action development for urban combat need work.
• Leaders are unsure how to effectively fight once in the city.
• Communications problems in urban conditions are a major challenge.
• Leaders at all levels have problems with rules of engagement and proportionality.
• There is poor use of the Judge Advocate General in the brigade combat teams.
• The fight needs to be defined and clear to each unit level of responsibility.
• Units fail to get eyes on the objective (scouts/aviation) to shape the battle.
• Sniper teams are not properly used in planning and not considered as additional eyes on the objective.
• Confirmation of intelligence template is denied when no one can observe the objective.

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BOS

• Allocation of assets to support the urban fight is poor.
• Resupply and casualty evacuation in the urban fight are not conducted well.
• Urban-specific supply items: ladders, knee and elbow pads, and ropes with grappling hooks need to be available to all units preparing for this type of action.
• Units do not plan for urban combat and the high died-of-wounds rate.
• Speed, not haste, in the tempo of urban operations should be the norm.

AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY BOS

• There is a poor allocation of ADA assets to support the urban fight overall.
• Focusing of the correct ADA assets at the proper place and time in the battle is poor.
• Attack aviation vulnerability in battle positions is not taken into consideration in the operations order.

SECTION IX: OPERATIONS IN A HIGH-ALTITUDE ENVIRONMENT

Soldiers deploying to Afghanistan will adapt to the conditions they may face and will perform their mission well once they understand the simple rules of soldiering at high altitudes.

What soldiers can expect while conducting high-altitude operations

Many soldiers are recreational skiers, skiing under the pristine conditions of some high glacier or mountain in Europe or in the western United States, and often experiencing the symptoms of high-altitude sickness. The headaches, the lethargic feeling, the lack of an appetite, the feeling of exhaustion, and the dehydration associated with the energy expenditure on the slopes have made many skiers call it an early day. The same skiers return the following day unaware of their increased resistance to the high altitude. This newly discovered energy is simply becoming adjusted to their new environment. In many cases, the skiers increase their energy level expenditure for each subsequent day, with growing familiarity, conditioning, and confidence in their new surroundings. The skiers are simply compensating for each day's problems by drinking a lot of fluids, eating well at night (eating in many cases way above their normal intake), and dropping into a sound and restful sleep. They emerge from their hotel the next day rested and ready to deal with the slopes and their new surroundings, having adjusted their body and mind to the conditions.

The high-altitude battlefield

The al-Qaida and Taliban forces that U.S. and coalition forces are fighting in Afghanistan have numerous factors favoring their use of high-altitude operations. The high-altitude Afghanistan region bordering Pakistan resembles the area on the Pakistan and India border where numerous clashes have occurred between Pakistan and India. This includes battles on the Siachin Glacier, which has the distinction of being the world's highest battlefield at 19,000 feet. The Indian and Pakistani armies facing each other on this battlefield have been credited as being the foremost experts of high-altitude warfare for good reason. In operations against each other, their casualties have been high, yet the most significant factor