The Greco-Italian War—May to August 1940 (part 2)
by Dale R. Cozort
August 8, 2002

Dale R. Cozort's "Alternative Futures Past" is StrategyPage.com's foray in to the what-if genre. We hope you enjoy this unique look at history.

Note: This is part two of a four part scenario. It looks at the opposing forces and their potential. .

The opposing forces: The Greeks have had ample warning of what is likely to come. They have very close to the same forces they did historically in October of 1940. They initially have around four divisions on the Albanian frontier, but they can expand that to twelve divisions on full mobilization, with as many as seven more divisions keeping an eye on the Bulgarians and guarding against Italian landings on the long Greek coastline. Greek forces have very limited anti-tank and anti-aircraft capability.

The Greeks spent a great deal of money in the late 1930s building a formidable set of defenses called the Metaxas line. Unfortunately, that line faces the Bulgarian frontier, not the Albanian one that the Italians will be attacking from. Defenses on the Albanian frontier are mainly field works.

The Italians have had time to build up a lot, though there is a limit to the size of the force that can be supplied through Albania’s harbor facilities. Historically the Italians attacked with roughly nine weak divisions after two weeks of preparation. Incredibly, they attacked an enemy that when fully mobilized was numerically superior locally They attacked in late fall at the start of a rainy season that left streams swollen and made air support difficult. In this scenario they have around twenty divisions available in Albania for the attack, and two more keeping an eye on the Yugoslav border. Three divisions in Italy are standing by to be deployed against Greek islands or landed at some point along the coast if the British don’t interfere and if the Italians can find enough shipping to move them and keep them supplied.

The Italian armed forces of May 1940 are not particularly formidable in the context of war with a great power. In the context of a war with Greece, they are formidable. In terms of divisions, the Italians have a numeric superiority—around 5 to 1 initially, though that drops below 2 to 1 when the Greeks mobilize and get their troops in position.

The Italians have a big edge in armor, though it isn’t high quality armor. They have two armored divisions. Those divisions have a couple hundred machine-gun armed tankettes between the two of them, along with a few worn-out Fiat 3000s—improved copies of the French World War I Renault FT17. The only reasonably modern tanks are 60 M11/39s—most of the M11/39s they’ve produced so far. The M11/39s are awkward-looking tanks, with a 37mm gun mounted in the hull and machine guns mounted in the turret. The Greeks have only a motley collection of armor—a couple of French tanks dating from the 1920’s, a couple of British 6-ton tanks purchased for evaluation, and a few armored cars useful mainly for internal security. The Italians also have superior artillery, though most of their guns are old.

The balance in the air is initially surprisingly close to even. The Italians are concerned enough about British and French intervention that they keep most of their modern planes in Italy or North Africa. The Greek invasion is initially supported by a little over a hundred fighter bi-planes, about equally divided between the early 1930s era Cr-32 and the more modern Cr-42. The Italians also have a little over a hundred reasonably good three-engine S79 bombers. In a pinch the Italians can pull in more of the roughly 200 Cr-42s that they have in service, or even some of the 100 to 150 low-wing monoplanes like the Fiat G.50s or Machi Mc200s that are starting to enter Italian service. The Italians do bring in a squadron or two of each of those fighters to give them a combat trial.

The Greeks counter with around 45 fighter planes, most of them Polish-built PZL-P24f and P24g. They also have 9 French-built Bloch 151s, a faster and somewhat modern design. The Polish-built planes are high-wing monoplanes of a slightly more recent vintage than the Cr-32s. They are about 35 miles per hour faster and better armed than the older Italian Cr-32 fighters, but not as maneuverable. Unfortunately for the Greeks, the Pzl-24s are 30 miles per hour slower than the Italian S79 bombers. The Greeks don’t have radar, and rely on a primitive spotter system to intercept Italian bombers. Given the small number of Greek fighters and their lack of speed, the Greeks have limited success in downing Italian bombers.

A war isn’t decided just by the material available to the opposing armies. Morale, unit cohesion, and especially training are key factors. Some of the Italian soldiers have combat experience from the Spanish civil war or from the Italian conquest of Ethiopia. On the other hand Italian training standards are abysmal, especially for the army. Italian logistics are bad—barely able to sustain a unit in a static position, and incapable of dealing with one in motion. The Italians have a lot of men with rifles, but they are very deficient in the bread-and-butter items of 1940s combat. They have few trucks and even fewer radios.

Italian leadership is bad from the top down, though not uniformly so. From Mussolini’s erratic decision-making to cowardly division commanders to scarce and poorly trained NCOs, the Italian soldiers have to deal with a leadership prone to putting them in untenable situations. Italian soldiers themselves are a mixed bag, quite capable of hard, stubborn defensive fighting when properly led, but usually not very effective on the offensive. There is no history of major rivalry between Greece and Italy, so Italian troops have difficulty understanding why they are being sent into this war.

The Greeks have a major advantage in morale. They also have a major advantage in terrain. Italy is invading on a narrow front through a very tough mountainous area, that the Greeks know intimately. On the other hand, the Italians are relying heavily on Alpine divisions--elite mountain troops like the ones in the Julia division. Those troops are tough fighters--respected even by people who look down at the bulk of the Italian army.

What happens when the Italian attack? Does the attack result in the same type of fiasco that happened in their attack in October 1940 in our time-line but on an even larger scale? Are they able to roll over the outnumbered defenders? Do outside powers get drawn into the battle? How do England and France react? How does Yugoslavia react? How does Hitler react to this complication in the Balkans during the Battle for France?

Next issue: The course of the war.